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ACCESS TO SAFETY AND JUSTICE: 
SERVICE OF PROCESS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CASES 
Jane K. Stoever* 
Abstract: Every day, in courthouses across America, numerous domestic violence 
protection order cases are dismissed for lack of personal service, even though law enforcement 
is tasked under federal law with effectuating service. Service of process presents substantial 
access to justice and access to safety issues for domestic violence survivors who seek legal 
protection, as nearly 40% of petitioners for civil protection orders are unable to achieve 
personal service on those against whom they seek protection. Research shows that the civil 
protection order remedy is the most effective legal means for intervening in and eliminating 
abuse, yet petitioners who fail to achieve personal service—whether because respondents 
evade service or are impossible to locate yet continue threats and abuse—are left without 
vitally needed protection. Procedural rules operate to inhibit the legal remedy’s effectiveness 
and create a two-stage dilemma by: (1) often requiring notice prior to the temporary protection 
order stage, which can create danger pre-hearing, and (2) requiring personal service for a full 
protection order when danger may still exist and the respondent may successfully evade 
service. 
In stark contrast, other areas of the law—including antitrust, bankruptcy, domestic and 
international business, eviction, divorce, and termination of parental rights—readily permit 
alternative service methods. In seeking to understand the law’s differential treatment of 
domestic violence, this Article explores the historic origins of the heightened notice and service 
requirements for domestic violence remedies and the ongoing race, class, and gender 
implications, including as displayed by the #MeToo movement. In proposing expanded service 
methods that satisfy due process rights and address procedural justice, the Article examines 
both the respondent’s interests and the petitioner’s constitutionally protected right to a hearing 
on the merits, which is not normally acknowledged. States need not wait for tragedy before 
making the protection order remedy more accessible, as has been the pattern for several states 
that have adopted alternative service means for domestic violence remedies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Barbara came to my domestic violence clinic in Orange County, 
California, after learning that her boyfriend had committed horrific acts 
of sexual abuse against her eight-year-old daughter from a prior 
relationship.1 He fled when Barbara discovered his abuse and called the 
police, but Barbara and her daughters live in fear of his return. We 
received judicial permission to serve via publication a termination of 
parental rights case concerning the younger child they had in common,2 
but, at the time,3 California law required personal service for domestic 
violence civil protection orders, which we were unable to achieve. 
Heightened procedural requirements for domestic violence remedies 
impeded the effectiveness of this safety remedy and left Barbara and her 
daughters without needed court protection. 
Over one thousand miles away in Seattle, before Rebecca Jane Griego 
was murdered at age twenty-six by her ex-boyfriend, Jonathan Rowan, 
she sought a domestic violence protection order.4 She detailed in her court 
pleadings her inability to personally serve Jonathan despite his continued 
threats, writing, “[Jonathan] called me to tell me I cannot find him but he 
can find me . . . and to look over my shoulder because I would see him 
                                                     
1. Clients have given permission to share the details contained within this Article and their names 
and identifying information have been changed to protect confidentiality. 
2. Court pleadings and orders are on file with the Author. 
3. On behalf of Barbara and multiple other clients, the domestic violence clinic that I direct at the 
University of California, Irvine School of Law sought legislative reform to permit alternative service 
for domestic violence civil restraining orders. See Assemb. B. 2694, 2017–18 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2018). Effective January 1, 2019, petitioners can seek judicial permission for service by publication, 
mail, or other methods upon showing diligent efforts at personal service and that the respondent 
appears to be evading service. Act of Aug. 27, 2018, ch. 219, sec. 3, § 6340(2), 2018 Cal. Stat. 2498 
(codified at CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340(2) (West 2018)). Electronic service is not explicitly available, 
and petitioners bear the responsibility to motion for alternative service, issues that are explored in 
Parts II and V, infra. 
4. Jim Brunner & Nick Perry, Months of Stalking End with Two Dead at UW, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 
3, 2007, 7:18 PM), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/months-of-stalking-end-with-2-dead-
at-uw/ [https://perma.cc/7YJY-535K]. 
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again.”5 Tragically, two weeks later Jonathan came to Rebecca’s office at 
the University of Washington and fatally shot her before killing himself.6 
Following her daughter’s death, Rebecca’s mother recalled how in the 
weeks before Jonathan murdered her daughter, Rebecca “felt a crippling 
fear as she and her sister tried time and again to track down [the] abusive 
ex-boyfriend and serve him legal papers.”7 
Given the life-threatening nature8 of domestic violence,9 many abuse 
survivors seek court protection from further abuse in the form of civil 
protection orders.10 The moment of separation from an abusive partner 
and the ensuing period when seeking to remain free from abuse are now 
known to be times of heightened danger and lethality.11 During this period 
of acute danger, when survivors of abuse and stalking are most in need of 
legal protection, it may be denied because of victims’ inability to 
personally serve abusive partners. 
Personal service—or in-hand delivery of a summons to the opposing 
party by a person authorized by law—is required for domestic violence 
                                                     
5. Id. 
6. Id.; Seattle Times Staff, UW Staffer Killed by Stalker, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 2, 2007, 10:46 PM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/uw-staffer-killed-by-stalker/ [https://perma.cc/38PM-NX2W]. 
7. Nick Perry, Family of UW Worker Seeks New Law, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 21, 2008, 12:34 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/family-of-uw-worker-seeks-new-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/JKH7-KR8N]. 
8. SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: ATTRIBUTES OF 
VICTIMIZATION, 1993–2011, at 3 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvav9311.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KV9V-K7V5] (analyzing homicide data and concluding that women are more likely 
to be killed by an intimate partner than by any other person known or unknown to them); Susan 
Sorenson & Douglas Wiebe, Weapons in the Lives of Battered Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1412, 
1412–16 (2004) (“Firearms are more common in the households of battered women and their partners 
than among the general population, which is cause for concern, given the lethality of firearms.”). In 
two-thirds of these households, the intimate partner used the gun(s) against the woman, usually 
threatening to shoot/kill her (71.4%) or to shoot at her (5.1%). Id. at 1414.  
9. Domestic violence may consist of physical or verbal force, sexual abuse, acts of coercion or 
intimidation, the denial of access to resources, deprivation of liberty, or life-threatening situations that 
result in psychological or physical harm and subordinate the abused partner. See EVAN STARK, 
COERCIVE CONTROL 85–87 (Claire Renzetti & Jeffrey L. Edleson eds., 2007) (discussing the need to 
broaden definitions of domestic violence beyond physical abuse to include psychological, emotional, 
and other tactics and harms). 
10. Sally F. Goldfarb, Reconceiving Civil Protection Orders for Domestic Violence: Can Law Help 
End the Abuse Without Ending the Relationship?, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1487, 1489 (2008) (citing 
civil protection orders as the “most commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”). Note that 
different jurisdictions use the terms civil protection order, protective order, restraining order, domestic 
violence order, order for protection, order of protection, or peace bond to refer to the same civil legal 
remedy regarding intimate partners and family members. For clarity, this Article uses the term “civil 
protection order.” 
11. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from 
a Multisite Case Control Study, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1089, 1091 (2003). 
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civil protection orders in most jurisdictions.12 Although the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA)13 prohibits states from charging petitioners 
for service of process in domestic violence cases, and states require law 
enforcement agencies to serve protection order petitions and court orders 
on respondents without charging fees to petitioners,14 many respondents 
in domestic violence cases purposefully and successfully evade service.15 
For example, a recent study in Seattle determined that police were unable 
to accomplish service in more than 40% of protection order cases due to 
their inability to locate the subject.16 On any given day in courthouses 
across America, more than one-third of domestic violence civil protection 
order cases are continued or dismissed for lack of personal service.17 
Department of Justice statistics further show that approximately one-third 
of issued civil protection orders are not personally served as required in 
                                                     
12. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018) (requiring personal service for protection orders); 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1261(b) (2019) (only permitting alternative service on corporations); 
infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
13. 34 U.S.C. §§ 10450, 10461 (2018). 
14. Id. (requiring jurisdictions to certify that their laws and the practices of their courts and law 
enforcement agencies do not make domestic violence victims pay costs associated with the “filing, 
issuance, registration, modification, enforcement, dismissal, or service of a warrant, protection order, 
petition for a protection order, or witness subpoena”). The prohibition on charging fees is based on 
compliance requirements of the VAWA Services Training Officers Prosecutors (STOP) Violence 
Against Women Formula Grants and the VAWA Community Defined Solutions to Violence Against 
Women (CDS) (formerly entitled Grants to Encourage Arrest Policies and Enforcement of Protection 
Orders). Currently, all states, territories, and some tribes receive STOP grants, and many communities 
and tribes receive CDS funds. SARAH HENRY & MONICA N. PLAYER, NAT’L CTR. ON PROT. ORDERS & 
FULL FAITH & CREDIT, VAWA PROHIBITION ON FEES FOR SERVICE OF PROTECTION ORDERS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (2011), http://www.bwjp.org/assets/documents/pdfs/ 
vawa_prohibition_on_fees_for_service_of_protection_orders.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ8H-TR8A]. 
15. The author has numerous case examples on file. See also Restraining Order Dismissed for Lack 
of Service, LIEBER & GALPERIN LLP, http://losangelesrestrainingorderattorney.com 
/uncategorized/restraining-order-dimissed/ [https://perma.cc/D2GR-JRCS] (reporting that Kenya 
Moore, the Real Housewives of Atlanta reality television star, was forced to dismiss her civil restraining 
order case against her ex-boyfriend, Matt Jordan, because she could not serve him, although Jordan was 
calling Moore approximately thirty times per day and threatened her after she blocked his phone number). 
16. Rebecca Griego Bill Passes Senate Unanimously, U.S. ST. NEWS (Feb. 12, 2008); see also 
Natalie Singer, Legal Delays Add to Victims’ Fears, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 6, 2007, 2:02 AM), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/legal-delays-add-to-victims-fears/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z8CL-2E9Z] (reporting that in Seattle in 2006, only 58% of the 1,076 domestic violence temporary 
protection orders (TPO) sent to the police department for service were successfully served). 
17. Singer, supra note 16; see also SURVIVORS & ADVOCATES FOR EMPOWERMENT (DC SAFE), 
INC., DC DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT WATCH PROJECT: 2012 REPORT 29 (2013), 
https://courtwatchdc.files.wordpress.com/2013/08/2012courtwatchreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH 
3D-AC2F] (identifying that in the District of Columbia in 2012, 34% of cases were continued for lack 
of personal service and 12% of cases were dismissed for lack of service). 
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domestic violence cases; in contrast, only 4% of criminal restraining 
orders remain unserved.18 Whether abusers intentionally evade service or 
are otherwise unable to be located for personal service, these service 
requirements impede access to safety and justice for many abuse 
survivors.19 
Between 1976 and 1993, all fifty states and the District of Columbia 
enacted domestic violence civil protection order statutes.20 States must 
now ensure that petitioners have procedural access to hearings for these 
state-created remedies.21 Rather than defaulting to the broader state civil 
procedure codes, civil protection order remedies often have more stringent 
procedural rules imposed through family code provisions22 or under 
procedural rules governing domestic violence courts.23 Such heightened 
procedural requirements operate to decrease the legal remedy’s 
effectiveness by making such protection inaccessible to many victims, as 
shown by Rebecca and Barbara’s experiences. 
The current personal service requirement in domestic violence 
protection order cases stands in stark contrast to the alternative means of 
service permitted in many other areas of the law. Alternative service 
                                                     
18. Monica Rhor, Orders Often Fail to Restrain Violence, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 18, 2006, 
3:00 AM), https://www.ocregister.com/2006/03/18/orders-often-fail-to-restrain-violence/ [https://per 
ma.cc/WKR8-HCAB] (additionally reporting that over 40,000 California civil and criminal domestic 
violence protection orders were not served as of 2006).  
19. EMILIE MEYER, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CIVIL PROTECTION 
ORDERS: A GUIDE FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE 4 (2010), https://www.ncjfcj.org/sites/ 
default/files/cpo_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7TC-RQTX] (noting that barriers to accessing 
protection orders have gone unnoticed and unaddressed, and specifying that “the ability of the system 
to protect victims can be impeded by barriers in both service and enforcement”). 
20. Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of 
Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 28–32 (1999) (discussing 
the enactment of protection order remedies across the United States); Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. 
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 1070 (1993) (conducting a fifty-state survey concerning the recently 
enacted remedy); Domestic Violence/Domestic Abuse Definitions and Relationships, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/domestic-violence-
domestic-abuse-definitions-and-relationships.aspx [https://perma.cc/GB3C-GNMT] (mapping state 
laws regarding domestic violence or abuse and definitions of qualifying relationships and conduct 
that constitutes abuse). 
21. Infra note 37 and accompanying text. 
22. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018) (requiring personal service for domestic violence cases). 
23. See D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3); cf. D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CIV. PRO. 5 (identifying 
multiple options for service, including leaving pleadings and summons with the clerk’s office if the 
opposing party has no known address); Anderson v. Sherman, 178 Cal. Rptr. 38 (Ct. App. 1981) 
(Where the petitioner can validly accomplish service of process under either the provisions of the 
Code of Civil Procedure or an alternative statute, the requirements for service under a specific statute 
prevail over the more general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.). 
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methods are explicitly permissible in business,24 eviction,25 bankruptcy,26 
and criminal cases,27 in which liberty and financial interests are at stake. 
Alternative means of service are also available in other legal realms 
concerning intimate and familial relationships. For example, marriages 
can be dissolved, child custody and support can be awarded, and parental 
rights can be terminated following notice through publication in a 
newspaper of general circulation or by posting notice at a designated 
location.28 While articles from the past two decades discuss general trends 
toward electronic service,29 and New York now allows electronic service 
                                                     
24. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4; CAL. CORP. CODE § 15908.06 (Deering 2018) (publishing at least 
once in a newspaper is sufficient for notice of dissolution of limited partnership); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 9, § 280 (West 2018) (providing that dissolution of corporations may be notified by publication); 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1261(b) (West 2019) (permitting alternative service on corporations); 
Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 446 (Civ. Ct. 2008) (holding that N.Y. C.P.L.R. 
308 does not directly authorize service of process by email, but service by email is sufficient where 
other modes are unavailable). 
25. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1162, 1946 (West 2018) (providing alternative service 
where personal service is unavailable, including leaving a copy with someone of suitable age and 
discretion or affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-
211 (West 2018) (providing alternate service by leaving a copy to a person over the age of thirteen 
years residing on the premises, or by sending a copy via certified or registered mail); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 32-31-1-9 (West 2018) (giving notice to any resident or affixing a copy of the notice to a 
conspicuous part of the premises when the tenant is not present). 
26. Jeanne Finegan, The Web Offers Near, Real-Time Cost-Efficient Notice, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
June 2003, at 1–7.  
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 (“A summons is served on an individual defendant . . . by leaving a copy 
at the defendant’s residence or usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and discretion 
residing at that location and by mailing a copy to the defendant’s last known address.”); ALA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.4 (authorizing service of summons in the same manner as civil service except for 
publication, which includes the option of leaving a copy at the person’s abode); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 
17 (“A summons shall be served upon a witness by delivering a copy to him personally, by leaving it 
at his dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion then 
residing therein, or by mailing to the witness’ last known address.”). 
28. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 413.30 (“Where no provision is made in this chapter or other 
law for the service of summons, the court in which the action is pending may direct that summons be 
served in a manner which is reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the party to be served and 
that proof of such service be made as prescribed by the court.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 215 (West 2018) 
(providing that a motion for modification of custody, visitation, or child support may be served by 
mail); id. § 4724 (permitting service by certified mail or other means for child support delinquency); 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 294 (West 2018) (providing alternative service methods in dependent 
child proceedings); id. § 366.26 (providing for service by mail to terminate parental rights or establish 
guardianship of children adjudged dependent of the court); Application for Order for Publication or 
Posting (Family Law), CAL. CTS., http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/fl980.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QDF9-3JY8] (court form for requesting notice through publication or posting).  
29. See Jeremy A. Colby, You’ve Got Mail: The Modern Trend Towards Universal Electronic 
Service of Process, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 337, 339 (2003); Frank Conley, Service with a Smiley: The 
Effect of E-Mail and Other Electronic Communications on Service of Process, 11 TEMP. INT’L & 
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for divorce,30 alternative service is either not explicitly available in 
domestic violence cases or is exceedingly difficult to utilize.31 Service of 
process doctrine has generally evolved, but not with respect to domestic 
violence remedies. 
Service of process is intended to alert respondents to pending legal 
proceedings that affect their rights.32 In approaching the issue of service 
in domestic violence cases, this Article prioritizes actual notice for the 
reasons detailed below, rather than merely satisfying technical service of 
process requirements. Alternative service is not intended to simply 
produce default judgments. Instead, research and extensive experience 
litigating domestic violence cases reveal litigants’ challenges in accessing 
the courts,33 and the normative solutions for service of process rules that 
this Article identifies would better provide actual notice and reflect 
evolving technology and ways of living.34 
Service of domestic violence protection orders is both an issue of 
access to justice35 and access to safety, as such orders can provide critical 
protection at home, school, work, and wherever the protected person may 
be in the world. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained in Mullane v. 
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,36 once the state creates a remedy, it 
cannot deprive the petitioner of a hearing on that claim without due 
                                                     
COMP. L.J. 407 (1997); Finegan, supra note 26, at 1–7; John M. Murphy III, Note, From Snail Mail 
to E-Mail: The Steady Evolution of Service of Process, 19 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 73 (2004); 
Angela Upchurch, “Hacking” Service of Process: Using Social Media to Provide Constitutionally 
Sufficient Notice of Process, 38 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 559, 587 (2016); William Wagner & 
Joshua R. Castillo, Friending Due Process, Facebook as a Fair Method of Alternative Service, 19 
WIDENER L. REV. 259, 263 (2013). 
30. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706–08 (Sup. Ct. 2002). In the first case to authorize e-
service under rule 308(5) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, email service was acceptable 
in a divorce case when sent to a defendant who had been living in Saudi Arabia for two years and had 
only communicated with plaintiff through email, and other methods of service were impracticable. 
Id. at 708. The court allowed e-service, in combination with service through international registered 
and standard mail. Id. 
31. Infra Part II. Regarding electronic service, the District of Columbia recently amended its 
service rules to be the first jurisdiction to explicitly permit electronic service for civil protection 
orders. D.C. SUP. CT. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i) (West 2018). California, in contrast, did not allow 
electronic service for domestic violence matters when it recently amended its laws to permit 
alternative service. Act of Aug. 27, 2018, ch. 219, sec. 3, § 6340(2), 2018 Cal. Stat. 2498 (codified at 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340(2) (West 2018)). 
32. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950). 
33. Infra Part II. 
34. Infra Part V. 
35. The concept of access to justice encompasses a broad range of strategies to meet the legal needs 
of those who cannot afford counsel, including procedural access and justice issues. See infra notes 
38, 126–136 and accompanying text. 
36. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).  
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process of law.37 Because claims cannot be heard and substantive relief 
cannot be granted without satisfying service requirements, procedural 
rules requiring personal service in domestic violence cases present 
procedural access barriers. Instead, procedural rules should embrace 
procedural fairness and be designed to provide notice to respondents and 
safeguard the rights of litigants who need to utilize the legal remedies.38 
The obstruction of access to safety and justice is particularly dire for 
unrepresented individuals with limited means. Courts recognize that 
counsel is often of “central importance”39 to achieving service, but most 
abuse survivors lack the means to hire an attorney or private process 
server,40 and court staff generally will not answer questions about service 
of process or provide other basic legal information.41 Abused individuals, 
who must already contend with the physical and psychological effects of 
                                                     
37. Id. at 314–15; see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429 (1982) (“The Court 
traditionally has held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the 
courts, either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress 
grievances.”); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (holding that, under the Due Process 
Clause, states cannot limit the rights to adjudicatory procedures when doing so is “the equivalent of 
denying them an opportunity to be heard on their claimed right”).  
38. See Rebecca Aviel, Family Law and the New Access to Justice, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2279, 
2292 (2018) (“[I]f there are not enough lawyers to work the system, then we will change the system 
so that it relies less on lawyers.”); Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s 
Court, 47 CONN. L. REV. 741, 746 (2015) (explaining that demand-side reform requires the 
simplification of evidentiary and procedural rules so that pro se litigants can meaningfully participate 
in the court system). 
39. See Kleeman v. Rheingold, 614 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1993). 
40. JANE C. MURPHY & ROBERT RUBINSON, FAMILY MEDIATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 161 
(2009) (reporting that approximately 80% of family law litigants who technically qualify as indigent 
and are eligible for free legal assistance are unable to obtain representation); Margo Lindauer, 
Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Why Multi-Court-Involved Battered Mothers Just Can’t 
Win, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 797, 808 (2012) (identifying that the number of pro se 
litigants in family law cases is rapidly increasing); see also AM. PSYCH. ASS’N, VIOLENCE & 
SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 2 (2016), https://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-
violence.pdf [https://perma.cc/SJW8-55KY] (“Women who are physically assaulted are significantly 
more likely to have unstable employment than women who do not experience intimate partner 
violence.” (citations omitted)); id. (“Seventeen percent of cities cited domestic violence as the primary 
cause of family homelessness.”); Campbell et al., supra note 11, at 1091 tbl.1 (finding that women 
with income of under $10,000 are the largest category of women to experience domestic violence); 
Domestic Violence Survivors, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., https://www.nclc.org/special-
projects/domestic-violence-survivors.html [https://perma.cc/UDE5-EEN9] (“Many of these survivors 
of domestic violence, in addition to facing physical and emotional concerns, face serious financial 
concerns after separating from an abuser.”). 
41. Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice: Meeting the Challenge 
of Bench and Bar Resistance, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 36, 47 (2002) (identifying common refusal to provide 
information about service, statutes of limitations, methods of enforcing orders, and other basic rule-
related information that is not fact dependent). 
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domestic violence, report feeling extremely helpless, scared, and alone in 
their efforts to serve their abusers.42 
Although individuals of any age or racial, ethnic, economic, sexual, or 
gender identity can experience domestic violence, low-income women of 
color and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender individuals experience 
the highest rates of severe domestic violence.43 Low-income women of 
color are also most commonly the petitioners seeking court protection 
from abuse and are most affected by the access to justice gap.44 In sum, 
those who are most vulnerable to severe and lethal abuse are left to 
navigate court processes and make service attempts on their own. Often, 
police and abuse survivors cannot achieve personal service, meaning 
procedural requirements operate to impede the laws intended to protect 
victimized individuals against further abuse. 
This Article examines why domestic violence protections differentially 
demand personal service. Societal and legal reluctance to recognize 
domestic violence, bolstered by persistent disbelief of abuse survivors,45 
have resulted in differential treatment of and heightened standards for 
                                                     
42. See Perry, supra note 7. 
43. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IDENTIFYING AND PREVENTING GENDER BIAS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
RESPONSE TO SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 5 (2016) (“Sexual assault and domestic 
violence are crimes that disproportionately impact women, girls, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) individuals in the United States.”); NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & 
CONTROL, DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
SURVEY: 2010 FINDINGS ON VICTIMIZATION BY SEXUAL ORIENTATION 2 (2013), 
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/nisvs_sofindings.pdf [https://perma.cc/6U2S-RX2W] 
(concluding that 44% of lesbian women and 61% of bisexual women have experienced rape, physical 
violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner); WOMEN OF COLOR NETWORK, WOMEN OF COLOR 
NETWORK FACTS & STATS COLLECTION: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 2 (2006), 
https://www.doj.state.or.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/women_of_color_network_facts_ 
domestic_violence_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TTA-N6KG] (“African American females 
experience intimate partner violence at a rate 35% higher than that of white females, and about 2.5 
times the rate of women of other races.”). 
44. Tonya L. Brito et al., “I Do for My Kids”: Negotiating Race and Racial Inequality in Family 
Court, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3028 (2015) (“Although the population of low-income Americans 
most affected by the civil justice gap is disproportionately minority, race and racial inequality are 
understudied areas of inquiry in the access to justice literature.”); see Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to 
Civil Justice and Race, Class, and Gender Inequality, 34 ANN. REV. SOC. 339, 349 (2008). 
45. See generally Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 
YALE L.J. 2117, 2167–68 (1996) (detailing the husband’s historic right of chastisement and how courts 
characterized marriage as existing beyond law and in a “sphere separate from civil society”); Jane K. 
Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence Protective Orders, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 1015, 1018 (2014) (identifying the recency of the state’s response to domestic violence); Courtney 
Fraser, Comment, From “Ladies First” to “Asking for It”: Benevolent Sexism in the Maintenance of 
Rape Culture, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 141, 168 (2015) (identifying how consent is imputed for women who 
knew their attackers, and providing the example of a Texas county in which from 2008 to 2012, grand 
juries “failed to return an indictment in 51 percent of acquaintance rape cases, even when there was 
photographic evidence of the assault or when the defendant confessed to the rape”). 
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domestic violence relief, including in the civil context.46 The recent 
popularization of the #MeToo movement47 reveals how claims of severe 
and pernicious abuse often have to be made by multiple abuse survivors 
for allegations against an individual to be believed.48 This was true of 
Harvey Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Larry Nassar, and dozens of 
other high-profile individuals,49 including Rob Porter, a top aide in 
President Donald Trump’s White House who resigned amidst allegations 
and photographic evidence that he had abused his former wives.50 
Following Porter’s resignation, Trump tweeted, “Peoples[’] lives are 
                                                     
46. Stoever, supra note 45, at 1015. 
47. The hashtag #MeToo was started over a decade ago by African American activist Tarana Burke 
as a grassroots movement to aid sexual assault survivors in underserved communities. Based out of 
Harlem, she identified the lack of services in her community and began a movement of African 
American women talking to each other and sharing their stories. Zahara Hill, A Black Woman Created 
the “Me Too” Campaign Against Sexual Assault 10 Years Ago, EBONY MAG. (Oct. 18, 2017), 
www.ebony.com/news-views/black-woman-me-too-movement-tarana-burke-alyssa-milano 
[https://perma.cc/8TYP-8QHC]; ME TOO MOVEMENT, https://metoomvmt.org 
[https://perma.cc/V93Q-QN4P]. On October 15, 2017, building from this movement, actor Alyssa 
Milano tweeted, “If all the women who have been sexually harassed or assaulted wrote ‘Me too.’ as 
a status, we might give people a sense of the magnitude of the problem.” Alyssa Milano 
(@Alyssa_Milano), TWITTER (Oct. 15, 2017, 1:21 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Alyssa_Milano/status/919659438700670976 [https://perma.cc/6FMQ-8D5D].  
48. See Petula Dvorak, Like Trump, Many People Refuse to Believe Domestic Violence Victims. That 
Has to Stop., WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/like-trump-many-
people-refuse-to-believe-domestic-violence-victims-that-has-to-stop/2018/02/12/7459e23a-100c-11e8-
9570-29c9830535e5_story.html?utm_term=.cee871810de6 [https://perma.cc/5N67-CB9E]; Catherine 
A. MacKinnon, Opinion, #MeToo Has Done What the Law Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html [https://perma.cc/8MQX-
WKGD] (noting that in cases of campus sexual assault, “it typically took three to four women testifying 
that they had been violated by the same man in the same way to even begin to make a dent in his denial. 
That made a woman, for credibility purposes, one-fourth of a person”). The cases receiving national 
attention typically involve allegations by multiple individuals. For example, Eric Schneiderman, the 
Attorney General of New York who was a prominent figure in the #MeToo movement for taking action 
against Harvey Weinstein, was recently accused by four women of domestic violence that included 
choking, death threats, and severe sexual and psychological abuse. Jane Mayer & Ronan Farrow, Four 
Women Accuse New York’s Attorney General of Physical Abuse, NEW YORKER (May 7, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/four-women-accuse-new-yorks-attorney-general-of-
physical-abuse [https://perma.cc/B65W-3B7L]. 
49. See generally Doug Criss, The (Incomplete) List of Powerful Men Accused of Sexual 
Harassment After Harvey Weinstein, CNN (Nov. 1, 2017, 2:05 PM), 
www.cnn.com/2017/10/25/us/list-of-accused-after-weinstein-scandal-trnd/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/RK2U-8KAC]. 
50. Michael D. Shear & Emily Cochrane, The F.B.I., Domestic Abuse and the White House: A 
Timeline of the Rob Porter Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/13/us/politics/rob-porter-fbi-white-house-timeline.html (last 
visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
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being shattered and destroyed by a mere allegation”51—a common 
sentiment raised about intimate abuse claims.52 The hearing concerning 
Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s allegation of sexual assault against now-
Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh further shows survivors on trial, 
disbelief and distrust of claimants, and how even when survivor testimony 
is deemed “credible,” abuse may not matter to decision makers.53 Making 
domestic violence remedies procedurally accessible, rather than 
maintaining current procedural barriers, is essential to correct historic 
injustice and abuse and to prevent further intimate partner violence. 
Part I identifies the dangers of domestic violence, the escalation of 
abuse at the time of separation, and how civil protection orders often 
successfully prevent further harm. 
Part II details procedural rules regarding domestic violence cases, 
including rules requiring the petitioner to give notice to the respondent 
prior to seeking a temporary emergency order, rules mandating personal 
service for protection order cases, and rules requiring dismissal of cases 
for lack of service. Danger related to these rules is discussed, along with 
how, while VAWA54 requires that law enforcement effectuate service in 
domestic violence cases, insufficient resources are currently devoted to 
this task. 
Part III evaluates due process rights and concerns. It is well established 
that procedural due process requires notice of a legal proceeding and an 
opportunity to be heard or to respond, and service of process ensures the 
respondent’s right to notice.55 Significantly, the petitioner also has a 
constitutionally protected interest in a hearing on the merits of his or her 
claim “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,”56 and court 
rules must allow access to such a hearing.57 Respondents simply do not 
have a due process right to evade service or avoid litigation, and if 
                                                     
51. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 10, 2018, 7:33 AM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/962348831789797381 [https://perma.cc/6DHM-4F56]. 
52. See generally Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Credibility: Doubting the 
Testimony and Dismissing the Experiences of Domestic Violence Survivors and Other Women, 167 
U. PENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with author) (discussing how 
“routinely women survivors face a Gaslight-style gauntlet of doubt, disbelief, and outright dismissal 
of their stories”). 
53. See Erica Werner, Some GOP Senators Concede Ford’s Credibility, but Point to Lack of 
Corroboration, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/s 
ome-gop-senators-concede-fords-credibility-but-point-to-lack-of-corroboration/2018/09/27/6d97c484-
c287-11e8-b338-a3289f6cb742_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.defb1af1653d [https://perma.cc 
/M7FU-2FR8] (“Republican senators could not deny Thursday that Christine Blasey Ford appeared 
credible as she testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee. So they didn’t even try.”). 
54. 34 U.S.C. §§ 10450, 10461 (2018); see also infra Section II.C. 
55. See Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). 
56. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982). 
57. Id.; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
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procedural rules are so stringent as to prevent petitioners from achieving 
service, petitioners are denied the right of access to the courts. 
Part IV theorizes about the differential treatment of domestic violence 
cases, compared to service requirements in other areas of the law in which 
liberty, privacy, and financial interests are at stake. It examines the states’ 
historic acceptance of domestic violence and ongoing exceptionalism 
regarding domestic violence remedies. It further discusses demographic 
data and the racial, gender, and class-based implications of procedural 
barriers to court protection for abuse survivors, along with fact finders’ 
common disbelief and dismissal of abuse claims. 
Part V identifies law reform that would make legal protections for 
abuse victims more accessible while being more likely to actually notify 
respondents of domestic violence cases. First, states should abrogate laws 
that require pre-TRO notice and rescind laws that prevent access to a 
hearing on the merits of a petition, such as those requiring the dismissal 
of domestic violence cases for lack of service. Second, given VAWA’s 
mandate that law enforcement effectuate service for domestic violence 
cases, sheriffs and police should make diligent efforts at service, and 
failure to achieve personal service by the second hearing date should 
provide prima facie reason for permitting alternative service, including by 
electronic means to reflect modern life. Due to the safety and logistical 
difficulties in accomplishing personal service in many domestic violence 
cases, this Article recommends that all states adopt provisions 
automatically permitting alternative service after two hearing dates at 
which personal service is not achieved. Finally, the Article recommends 
that court rules enable petitioners to request alternative means, such as 
electronic service, from the outset upon filing domestic violence cases in 
situations in which the respondent’s home and employment addresses and 
whereabouts are unknown. 
The procedural reforms detailed in Part V would protect all rights at 
stake—both the respondent’s and petitioner’s procedural rights—and 
strike a reasonable balance in doing so. The handful of jurisdictions that 
permit alternative service have often been motivated to do so following 
tragic events,58 but states need not wait for tragedy before making the 
protection order remedy more accessible. 
                                                     
58. See, e.g., Rebecca Jane Griego Act, 2008 Wash. Sess. Laws 1536, 1536–38 (“This act shall be 
known as the Rebecca Jane Griego act.”); Rebecca Griego Bill Passes Senate Unanimously, supra 
note 16. 
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I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DANGERS AND THE NEED FOR 
PROTECTION ORDERS 
To provide context for the need for procedural access to legal remedies 
to protect victimized individuals and their children from domestic abuse, 
Section I.A identifies the harms of domestic violence and Section I.B 
focuses on the prevalence of “separation assault,” or the heightened risk 
of abuse and of lethality at the point of separation. Section I.C examines 
the efficacy of domestic violence protection orders, including data 
showing that civil protection orders provide the greatest safety outcomes 
of any legal relief available, which counsels in favor of making the remedy 
accessible. 
A. Domestic Violence Harms 
Domestic violence can be defined as the use of physical, sexual, 
emotional, economic, or psychological actions or threats of actions in 
intimate relationships to exert power and control over the other person.59 
The abusive partner may exploit immigration or health status in 
perpetrating abuse and engage in severe isolation tactics, such as 
restricting movements and associations.60 Racial, ethnic, and gender 
identities and poverty often make it more difficult to escape abuse, as 
survivors contend with multiple oppressions.61 In sum, domestic violence 
includes a range of behaviors that frighten, intimidate, terrorize, 
manipulate, injure, or humiliate the abused individual. 
Significantly, more than one-third of women who have experienced 
intimate partner violence have also experienced birth-control sabotage or 
                                                     
59. STARK, supra note 9, at 85–87. 
60. See generally Camille Carey & Robert Solomon, Impossible Choices: Balancing Safety and 
Security in Domestic Violence Representation, 21 CLINICAL L. REV. 201 (2014); Tori Cooke, 
Understanding Women’s Decision Making: The Intolerable Choice of Living in a Violent House or 
Escaping to the Uncertainty of Homelessness and Poverty, 4 PARITY 21 (2015); Jane K. Stoever, 
Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and 
AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157 (2009) [hereinafter Stoever, Stories Absent] (explaining that domestic 
violence responses must comprehensively respond to the multiple intersections survivors face, such 
as resource deprivation and language); Jane K. Stoever, Opinion, More Abuse for Victims of Violence: 
Those Who Suffer Shouldn’t Have to Choose Between Deportation and Medical Care, L.A. TIMES 
(July 17, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-stoever-mandatory-
reporting-domestic-violence-20170717-story.html [https://perma.cc/5KWQ-VRZB]. 
61. See generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, From Private Violence to Mass Incarceration: Thinking 
Intersectionally About Women, Race, and Social Control, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1418 (2012); Kimberlé 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242 (1991) (explaining that women’s experiences of violence are 
often shaped by multiple dimensions of their identities, including race and class). 
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reproductive coercion.62 Pregnancy is a time of heightened abuse and 
onset of serious physical violence, and intimate partner violence occurs 
with greater frequency when there are children in the home.63 Three-
quarters of women who experience physical intimate partner violence 
have minor children who live with them,64 and the abusive partner often 
uses children in the abuse, such as threatening to kidnap the children.65 
Abuse is also more likely to recur following separation when the parties 
have children in common,66 which naturally creates lifelong connections 
and opportunities for contact beyond the romantic relationship. 
Intimate partner abuse is rarely confined to a single, isolated event; 
instead, the abusive partner more commonly engages in an ongoing 
process of violence and control.67 Due to the repetitive, escalating nature 
of domestic violence, domestic violence survivors are more likely than 
victims of stranger violence to be re-assaulted, to experience more severe 
violence, and to sustain worse injuries, including weapons-inflicted 
injuries.68 As violence escalates, the risk that the abusive partner will kill 
                                                     
62. Elizabeth Miller et al., Pregnancy Coercion, Intimate Partner Violence and Unintended 
Pregnancy, 81 CONTRACEPTION 316, 322 (2010). Birth control sabotage refers to an intimate partner 
destroying, manipulating, or tampering with contraceptive devices to induce pregnancy. Id. 
Reproductive coercion includes “attempts to impregnate a partner against her will, control outcomes 
of a pregnancy, coerce a partner to have unprotected sex, and interfere with contraceptive methods.” 
AM. COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS, COMMITTEE OPINION: REPRODUCTIVE AND 
SEXUAL COERCION 1 (2013), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-
Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co554.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20181105T1612568052 
[https://perma.cc/CZ3F-K355]. 
63. Rebecca L. Burch & Gordon G. Gallup Jr., Pregnancy as a Stimulus for Domestic Violence, 19 
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 243, 243, 245 (2004). 
64. CAL. P’SHIP TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, CALIFORNIA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FACT SHEET 1 
(2011) (“The CWHS also revealed statistically significant higher rates of intimate partner violence 
among women who had been pregnant in the last five years (12%). Of those experiencing physical 
intimate partner violence, 75% of victims had children under the age of 18 years at home.” (footnote 
omitted)); H. LIEN BRAGG, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD PROTECTION IN 
FAMILIES EXPERIENCING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 (2003) (“An estimated 3.3 to 10 million children a 
year are at risk for witnessing or being exposed to domestic violence . . . .”). 
65. See Jane K. Stoever, Parental Abduction and the State Intervention Paradox, 92 WASH. L. REV. 
861, 862 (2017). 
66. Adele Harrell & Barbara Smith, Effects of Restraining Orders on Domestic Violence Victims, 
in DO ARRESTS AND RESTRAINING ORDERS WORK? 214, 218 (Eve S. Buzawa & Carl G. Buzawa 
eds., 1996). 
67. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE 
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN iii–iv (2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP2F-6G96]. 
68. DIV. OF VIOLENCE PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, 
NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY: 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 90 (2011), 
https://www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/NISVS_Report2010-a.pdf [https://perma.cc/X3LU-
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the victimized individual dramatically increases because of the heightened 
likelihood that the perpetrator will use a weapon against the survivor.69 
At its most dangerous, domestic violence is lethal. The majority of 
female homicide victims are killed through intimate partner violence.70 In 
2010, there were 157 domestic violence homicides in California alone.71 
The California Department of Justice, Criminal Justice Statistics Center 
reports that between 2009 and 2010, while all other homicide types 
decreased, intimate partner homicides increased by 20%.72 Nationwide, 
50% of individuals incarcerated in state prisons for spousal abuse had 
killed their victims73—a statistic that both highlights the lethal nature of 
abuse and the rarity of jail sentences for domestic violence.74 
B. Separation Assault 
Many abuse survivors seek safety through the courts, but separating 
from an abusive partner and initiating legal action against an abuser in 
                                                     
8SQC] (identifying that sexual abuse, intimate partner violence, and stalking “are often repetitive and 
can recur over long time periods”); MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE-RELATED 
INJURIES TREATED IN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 5–8 (1997), 
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4ddb/310658e83a29d5686200d8292db882734ea8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/TG5N-MY75] (reporting that among women treated for intimate partner violence 
in emergency rooms, 25% are treated for serious stabs, cuts, and internal injuries); Amy Sisley et al., 
Violence in America: A Public Health Crisis—Domestic Violence, 46 J. TRAUMA 1105, 1105–12 
(1999) (finding that 52% of domestic violence survivors receive injuries when being physically 
assaulted, as compared to 20% of victims of stranger assault, and measuring reassault over a six-
month period). 
69. See Mary Fan, Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence, 
90 IND. L.J. 151, 156 (2014) (“[N]early half of all incidents of firearms-related homicide take place 
in the home . . . . [A] substantial proportion of high-risk actors who go on to commit homicide-
suicides have a history of assaults and domestic disturbances but have never been in court.”); Amy 
Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A Deadly Combination, 79 FLA. B.J., 
Sept. 2005, at 79 (“Family and intimate assaults involving firearms are 12 times more likely to end in 
fatality than those not associated with firearms.”). 
70. Emiko Petrosky et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Homicides of Adult Women and the 
Role of Intimate Partner Violence—United States, 2003–2014, 66 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 741, 741–46 (2017). 
71. CAL. P’SHIP TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 64; KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, HOMICIDE IN CALIFORNIA, at 31 tbl.24 (2015). 
72. CAL. P’SHIP TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 64; HARRIS, supra note 71 (showing an 
increase in domestic violence associated homicides in California from 130 to 157 between 2009 and 2010). 
73. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS: 
INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 3 (2005), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6A7-YE5F]. 
74. See generally LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2018) (addressing 
the lack of efficacy of criminal responses to abuse); Jane K. Stoever, Freedom from Violence: Using 
the Stages of Change Model to Realize the Promise of Civil Protection Orders, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 303, 
308 (2011) (noting that abuse survivors frequently do not desire a criminal response). 
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which the survivor names and details the abuse puts survivors at risk for 
heightened danger. Femicide attempts typically occur as abused women 
attempt to leave relationships,75 and abuse survivors face the greatest risk 
of acute violence and lethality when separating from an abusive partner 
and during the period that follows.76 The survivor’s efforts to leave signal 
to the abusive partner an impending loss of control, and he or she 
frequently responds by escalating control tactics, punishing the survivor 
through threats and violence, retaliating for the separation, or attempting 
to intimidate the survivor into returning.77 Rather than ensuring the 
survivor’s safety, separation from an abusive partner instead often 
escalates and intensifies the abuser’s violence. Martha Mahoney describes 
the common phenomenon of “separation assault” as efforts and attacks 
that “are aimed at preventing or punishing the woman’s autonomy. They 
are major—often deadly—power moves.”78 
Quantitative and qualitative research confirms that abusive partners 
often commit high-level violence when the survivor exits the 
                                                     
75. Jacquelyn C. Campbell et al., Intimate Partner Homicide: Review and Implications of Research 
and Policy, 8 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 246, 254 (2007) (finding the first three months after 
separation to be the time of most risk, the combination of physical and legal separation presented the 
greatest risk for homicide by an intimate partner, and most murders occurred within the first year after 
separation); Christina Nicolaidis et al., Could We Have Known? A Qualitative Analysis of Data from 
Women Who Survived an Attempted Homicide by an Intimate Partner, 18 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
788, 791 (2003). 
76. Campbell et al., supra note 11, at 1091 (“When the worst incident of abuse was triggered by 
the victim’s having left the abuser for another partner or by the abuser’s jealousy, there was a nearly 
5-fold increase in femicide risk . . . . When the incident was triggered by the victim’s having left the 
abuser for any other reason, femicide risks were also significantly increased.”); Barbara Hart, Beyond 
the “Duty to Warn”: A Therapist’s “Duty to Protect” Battered Women and Children, in FEMINIST 
PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 234, 240 (Kersti Yllö & Michele Bograd eds., 1988) (“The decision 
by a battered woman to leave is often met with escalated violence by the batterer.”); Catherine F. 
Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State 
Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 815–16 (1993) (“Violence is often triggered by the 
anger aroused by threatened loss and excessive feelings of dependency—making the period during 
and after separation an extremely dangerous time.”); Maribeth L. Rezey, Separated Women’s Risk for 
Intimate Partner Violence: A Multiyear Analysis Using the National Crime Victimization Survey, J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE, Feb. 21, 2017, at 13 (“On average, separated women were significantly 
more likely than divorced (t = 4.03) and never married women (t = 3.91) to be victims of [intimate 
partner violence].”). 
77. MEYER, supra note 19, at 1; Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining 
the Issue of Separation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5–7, 65 (1991) (exploring abusers’ violent and coercive 
acts when the survivor decides to separate or begins to prepare to leave the abusive partner). 
78. Mahoney, supra note 77, at 5–6, 65. 
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relationship,79 and approximately two-thirds of all women who separate 
from their abusive partners are re-victimized by them.80 Studies have 
shown that an abuse survivor’s risk increases by 75% upon leaving, and 
heightened danger continues for two years.81 Researchers have 
consistently found that at least 75% of reported domestic violence 
incidents involved women who were separating from or already separated 
from their batterers.82 In addition to the immediate threat of separation 
assault, continued abuse can happen over lengthier periods of time.83 
Abuse survivors undertake many efforts to protect themselves and their 
children from further violence. Rather than passively experiencing abuse, 
many abused individuals are actively surviving the abuse by constantly 
strategizing, planning, and attempting to achieve freedom from violence.84 
                                                     
79. Ruth E. Fleury et al., When Ending the Relationship Does Not End the Violence: Women’s 
Experiences of Violence by Former Partners, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1315, 1376 (2000). 
80. Jane Koziol-McLain et al., Predictive Validity of a Screen for Partner Violence Against Women, 
21 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 93, 97–99 (2001) (finding that two-thirds of separated abused women 
were re-victimized during the four-month period of the study, and stating that “even though abused 
women separate from their partners, they do not automatically become safe”); see also Campbell et 
al., supra note 11, at 1095 (identifying “estrangement” as a risk factor for intimate partner femicide, 
and concluding “extremely controlling abusers are particularly dangerous under conditions of 
estrangement”); Kim Y. Slote et al., Battered Mothers Speak Out: Participatory Human Rights 
Documentation as a Model for Research and Activism in the United States, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 1367, 1380 (2005) (“The majority of women said that after they left their expartners and 
went to family court, the batterers continued to subject them and their children to some form of abuse 
or mistreatment. More than a third said that their expartners stalked them postseparation, and nearly 
a quarter said that their expartners threatened to kill them.”). 
81. SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT AND 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 10–11 (2012) (“When a battered woman leaves her abuser, her chances of being 
killed increase significantly.”). 
82. RONET BACHMAN & LINDA E. SALTZMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN: ESTIMATES FROM THE REDESIGNED SURVEY 4 (1995), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/FEMVIED.PDF [https://perma.cc/JU47-HA94] (finding that 
among domestic violence victims, “the victimization rate of women separated from their husbands 
was about 3 times higher than that of divorced women and about 25 times higher than that of married 
women”); CAROLYN REBECCA BLOCK, RISK FACTORS FOR DEATH OR LIFE-THREATENING INJURY 
FOR ABUSED WOMEN IN CHICAGO 6 (2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/199732.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L67Y-BNEL] (“Most clinic/hospital women in this study (85 percent) who had 
experienced severe violence in the previous year had left or tried to end the relationship in the previous 
year, and most women homicide victims (75 percent) had left or tried to end the relationship in the 
previous year.”); Douglas A. Brownridge et al., Violence Against Separated, Divorced, and Married 
Women in Canada, 2004, 49 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 308, 309 (2004) (“Separated women 
reported 7 times the prevalence of violence and divorced women reported twice the prevalence of 
violence than married women in the year prior to the study.”). 
83. Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research, Part I: Law 
Enforcement 29–30 (Apr. 2008) (unpublished research report), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/222319.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9J-4EYQ] (while at least 
one-third of abusers re-abuse in a short timeframe, more re-abuse in longer periods). 
84. See generally Stoever, supra note 74. 
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For example, Rebecca Griego had moved multiple times, changed her 
phone number, and received accommodations to work from home for a 
month so that her abuser could not attack her at work.85 She also sought a 
protection order, but was unable to secure full legal protection due to her 
inability to personally serve her ex-boyfriend.86 
C. Efficacy of Protection Orders 
This Article focuses on increasing access to domestic violence civil 
protection orders because protection orders (1) are the legal remedy most 
utilized by abuse survivors, even more so than criminal justice 
responses,87 and (2) are the most effective legal remedy available to 
decrease or eliminate domestic violence.88 In fact, researchers have 
concluded that protection orders “appear to be one of the few widely 
available interventions for victims of [intimate partner violence] that has 
demonstrated effectiveness.”89 
The domestic violence protection order remedy is a civil action that 
potentially has criminal consequences for violation.90 Civil protection 
orders provide injunctive relief to prevent and remedy abuse,91 including 
orders prohibiting the abusive party from continued abuse, threats, 
stalking, harassment, or possession of a firearm upon a finding of 
domestic violence.92 Orders may also prohibit or limit the respondent’s 
                                                     
85. Seattle Times Staff, supra note 6. 
86. Brunner & Perry, supra note 4. 
87. Susan Keilitz, Improving Judicial System Responses to Domestic Violence: The Promises and 
Risks of Integrated Case Management and Technology Solutions, in HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES 147, 149 (Albert R. Roberts ed., 2002) (finding that domestic 
violence victims are more likely to seek relief from violence solely in the civil system through 
protection orders, as compared to using the criminal justice system); Stoever, supra note 74, at 308 
(discussing why civil protection orders are the most common legal remedy used for domestic 
violence); see also Goldfarb, supra note 10, at 1489 (identifying civil protection orders as the “most 
commonly used legal remedy for domestic violence”). 
88. Infra notes 101–116 and accompanying text. 
89. Victoria Holt et al., Do Protection Orders Affect the Likelihood of Future Partner Violence and 
Injury?, 24 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 16, 21 (2003). 
90. In re Marriage of Holtorf, 922 N.E.2d 1173 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); Rankin v. Criswell, 277 S.W.3d 
621 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); E.C.O. v. Compton, 984 N.E.2d 787 (Mass. 2013); J.D. v. M.D.F., 25 A.3d 
1045 (N.J. 2011). 
91. Wolt v. Wolt, 2010 ND 33, 778 N.W.2d 802; State ex rel. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 218 
S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App. 2007). 
92. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (West 2019) (describing the different forms of relief a court 
can award). 
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contact with protected parties, including the petitioner, petitioner’s 
children, and household members; order the respondent to participate in 
batterer intervention treatment, parenting skills classes, a psychological 
evaluation, or drug or alcohol treatment; award custody, visitation, child 
support, spousal support, or payment for medical bills or property 
damage; and award possession of pets and property, among other relief 
necessary to the effective resolution of the matter.93 
Domestic violence protection order proceedings are intended to 
“quickly and effectively” intervene in abusive situations and prevent the 
tragic escalation of violence.94 Protection orders are “remedial in nature,” 
and courts agree that domestic violence law is to be “broadly construed to 
‘effectuate its humanitarian and preventive purposes.’”95 Numerous 
courts identify that the proceedings are intended to be “summary in 
nature”96 and “expeditious.”97 States also consistently indicate that the 
civil protection order relief shall be “immediate”98 and “easily 
accessible.”99 Appellate courts in Texas, for example, explain that the 
statute authorizing the domestic violence remedy is intended to “provide 
an expedited procedure for victims of domestic violence; the purpose is 
not to correct past wrongs or establish liability but to give immediate 
protection to the applicant.”100 
Multiple studies have shown that protection orders are effective at 
eliminating or markedly decreasing abuse101 and at helping survivors feel 
                                                     
93. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200 (West 2018) (describing various forms of relief available 
upon a finding of domestic abuse). 
94. Hanneman v. Nygaard, 2010 ND 113, 784 N.W.2d 117, 123; see also Lear v. Jamrogowicz, 
2013 MT 147, ¶26, 370 Mont. 320, 303 P.3d 790 (“The object of a [proceeding for a temporary order 
of protection] is the swift and efficient protection of one who is being harassed and intimidated by 
another.”). 
95. Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 634 (Tex. App. 2015) (citing Boyd v. Palmore, 425 S.W.3d 
425, 430 (Tex. App. 2011)). 
96. Hanneman, 784 N.W.2d at 123. 
97. Putman v. Kennedy, 932 A.2d 439, 442–43 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007) (“The legislature 
promulgated § 46b–15 to provide an expeditious means of relief for abuse victims.”). 
98. N.Y. FAMILY LAW § 812(2)(b) (McKinney 2018); In re Rollerson v. New, 901 N.Y.S.2d 515 
(Fam. Ct. 2010) (identifying that the purpose of New York’s civil domestic violence remedies is to 
provide immediate redress from abuse or from specified criminal acts committed by an intimate 
partner or household member without requiring an arrest or criminal prosecution). 
99. LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2131 (West 2018) (regarding the Domestic Abuse Assistance Act, “It is 
the intent of the legislature to provide a civil remedy for domestic violence which will afford the 
victim immediate and easily accessible protection.”); Dvilansky v. Correu, 204 So.3d 686, 689 (La. 
Ct. App. 2016). 
100. Roper, 493 S.W.3d at 634. 
101. See generally Matthew Carlson et al., Protective Orders and Domestic Violence: Risk Factors 
for Re-Abuse, 14 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 205 (1999) (concluding that abuse survivors experience a 
“significant decline in the probability of abuse” following the entry of a civil protection order); see 
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safer and more empowered.102 A study of nearly 2,700 women who had 
reported domestic violence to the police found that those who obtained 
civil protection orders experienced an 80% decrease in subsequent police-
reported physical violence.103 Overall, these women experienced 
significantly decreased likelihoods of physical and non-physical intimate 
partner violence, including decreased risk of contact by the abusive 
partner, weapon threats, injuries, and abuse-related medical treatment.104 
Many abused individuals never make police reports, so police data only 
reveal a portion of domestic violence incidents,105 but qualitative studies 
                                                     
also Victoria Holt et al., Civil Protection Orders and Risk of Subsequent Police-Reported Violence, 
288 JAMA 589, 590–92 (2002) (conducting a population-based study and reviewing police records 
to examine the effectiveness of protection orders, and finding that having a permanent protection 
order was associated with a significantly decreased risk of new episodes of violence); Catherine L. 
Kothari et al., Protection Orders Protect Against Assault and Injury: A Longitudinal Study of Police-
Involved Women Victims of Intimate Partner Violence, 27 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2845, 2859 
(2012) (confirming the “protective effect of [protection orders], which are associated with reduced 
police incidents and emergency department visits both during and after the order, and reduced police 
incidents compared to a matched comparison group”); Judith McFarlane et al., Intimate Partner 
Violence Against Immigrant Women: Measuring the Effectiveness of Protection Orders, 16 AM. J. 
FAM. L. 244, 248 (2002) (finding that immigrant women who sought protection orders experienced a 
significant decrease in violence and stalking throughout the duration of the study, comparable to 
reduced violence experienced by women born in the United States who receive protection orders, and 
concluding, “[c]learly, contact with the justice system and application for a protection order is a 
powerful deterrent to further abuse and can be deemed highly effective in terms of subsequent intimate 
partner violence against immigrant women”); Judith McFarlane et al., Protection Orders and Intimate 
Partner Violence: An 18-Month Study of 150 Black, Hispanic, and White Women, 94 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 613, 613–18 (2004) (finding significant reductions in physical assaults, stalking, threats to 
do bodily harm, and worksite harassment among women who sought and qualified for protection 
orders); cf. Jane C. Murphy, Engaging with the State: The Growing Reliance on Lawyers and Judges 
to Protect Battered Women, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 499, 510–14 (recognizing that 
abuse survivors use multiple legal and non-legal strategies to prevent violence; that obtaining only an 
emergency TPO achieves some women’s goals; and that significant institutional barriers and the lack 
of representation make it difficult for many litigants to complete the protection order process). 
102. TK Logan et al., Factors Associated with Separation and Ongoing Violence Among Women 
with Civil Protective Orders, 23 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 377, 382 (2008) (In a study of 700 women who 
received protection orders, 78% reported that they felt safe as a result of the order and that the orders 
were effective.). 
103. Holt et al., supra note 101, at 591–92. 
104. Id. 
105. See Michelle Fugate et al., Barriers to Domestic Violence Help Seeking, 11 VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN 290, 295 (2005) (In a study of nearly 500 abused women who were receiving 
medical care in a public health clinic or hospital, 62% of the women had not called the police for 
help.); see also TK LOGAN & ROB VALENTE, WHO WILL HELP ME? DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
SURVIVORS SPEAK OUT ABOUT LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSES 2 (2015), 
http://www.thehotline.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/09/NDVH-2015-Law-Enforcement-
Survey-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/6WXD-2CTV] (reporting results of a 2015 survey conducted by 
the National Domestic Violence Hotline, which found that one-quarter of abuse survivors who had 
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with abuse survivors show dramatic decreases in rates of physical and 
non-physical abuse following the entry of a civil protection order. In one 
study, 86% of the women who received a protection order stated that the 
abuse either stopped or was greatly reduced.106 Another interview-based 
study found a 70% decrease in physical abuse among women who 
maintained their protection orders.107 
Courts can issue temporary protection orders (TPO) on an ex parte 
basis to provide immediate safety protection against imminent harm, but 
such orders are typically only in effect for five days to three weeks at a 
time.108 Permanent or long-term protection orders produce more 
substantial safety outcomes.109 Multiple studies have found a correlation 
between the duration of the protection order and the survivor’s safety, 
which researchers describe as a “dose-response relationship according to 
the duration of the [civil protection order].”110 Having long-term orders, 
rather than merely a TPO, therefore, can be key to significantly decreasing 
future violence and sustaining an end to abuse.111 
Significantly, abuse survivors perceive the orders as valuable, 
effective, and crucial to their safety.112 In a study of women who had 
                                                     
previously called the police to report abuse would not call police again to report intimate violence; 
80% of these respondents worried that a future call to the police would result in the police doing 
nothing or not believing them, and a majority feared that calling the police again would make the 
violence worse). 
106. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL RESPONSE 
164 (1999); see also Julia Henderson Gist et al., Protection Orders and Assault Charges: Do Justice 
Interventions Reduce Violence Against Women, 15 AM. J. FAM. L. 59, 60 (2001) (discussing James 
Ptacek’s research on the effectiveness of protection orders). 
107. Holt et al., supra note 89, at 20. 
108. D.C. CODE § 16–1004 (West 2019); CAL. FAM. CODE § 6256 (West 2019). 
109. Carlson et al., supra note 101, at 214 (showing a 66% overall decline in women reporting 
violence before and after protection orders during a two-year follow-up period, with a 68% decline in 
those with permanent orders, compared to a 52% reduction in violence for those with temporary 
orders); Holt et al., supra note 89, at 20 (finding significant decreases in risk among women who kept 
their protection orders in effect over time). 
110. Holt et al., supra note 89, at 21. 
111. Factors in addition to protection order duration can contribute to the effectiveness of 
protection orders. For example, orders that contain more comprehensive and specified relief are more 
likely to provide protection to survivors. TK Logan et al., Protective Orders in Rural and Urban 
Areas, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 876, 906 (2005). Differences in communities’ implementation 
and enforcement of orders and in the availability of confidential shelters and other safety resources in 
a geographic region can also affect the efficacy of orders. Id. at 899. 
112. TK Logan & Robert Walker, Civil Protection Order Outcomes: Violations and Perceptions 
of Effectiveness, 24 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 675, 677–78, 682–83 (2009) (reporting on a study 
of 700 women with protection orders and finding that 51% believed the orders were “extremely 
effective” and 27% found their orders to be “fairly effective,” while 14% did not find the orders 
effective and 7% were unsure). 
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recently obtained TPOs, 98% of women felt more in control of their lives, 
91% felt that obtaining the order was a good decision, and 89% felt more 
in control of their relationship due to the court order.113 A majority of 
women also report feeling safer after obtaining permanent protection 
orders. In a study of nearly 700 women who had received permanent 
protection orders, 43% felt “extremely safe” and 34% felt “fairly safe,” 
while 10% did not feel safe and 12% were unsure about how they felt.114 
Although protection order recipients generally experience an overall 
decrease in violence, approximately one-half of protective orders are 
violated by abusive partners.115 The rate of violation increases to more 
than two-thirds when the respondent has previously raped or stalked the 
abuse survivor.116 Despite the high rates of violations, the orders are 
associated with a reduction in the severity and frequency of violence and 
the fear of harm for the majority of abuse survivors.117 The overall 
decrease in violence demonstrates the value and potential of protection 
orders, while the re-abuse rates show the need for continued court 
protection and improved abuse prevention efforts and community 
responses to abuse. 
While abuse survivors most commonly choose civil protection orders 
among criminal and civil legal options, this legal remedy is not the 
solution for every abused individual. The courtroom environment and 
public nature of these adversarial proceedings have adverse psychological 
effects on some survivors. Psychiatrist Judith Herman observes, “If one 
set out by design to devise a system for provoking intrusive post-traumatic 
                                                     
113. Karla Fischer & Mary Rose, When “Enough is Enough”: Battered Women’s Decision Making 
Around Orders of Protection, 41 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 414, 417 (1995). 
114. Logan & Walker, supra note 112, at 683 (finding that women who experienced very severe 
violence or stalking felt less safe than protection order recipients who had not had such experiences). 
115. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 52 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181867.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KP2F-6G96] (noting that the National Violence Against Women survey found 
69.7% of those stalked, 67.6% of those sexually assaulted, and 50.6% of those physically assaulted 
by a partner reported a violation of the order); Logan & Walker, supra note 112, at 682–83 (studying 
700 women with protection orders using self-reports of specific violent behaviors, arrest records for 
protection order violations, and perceptions of violations, and finding that three-fifths of women 
experienced a violation of the order and there was no difference in violation rates between urban and 
rural jurisdictions). 
116. TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 115, at 52. 
117. Jaime Kay Dahlstedt, Notification and Risk Management for Victims of Domestic Violence, 
28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 8 (2013). 
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symptoms, one could not be better than a court of law.”118 State 
intervention—whether civil or criminal—can prompt numerous 
unexpected consequences for abuse survivors.119 In some jurisdictions, 
the report of children being present during intimate partner violence 
triggers a Child Protective Services investigation and a “failure to protect” 
case to be filed against the abuse survivor under the theory that the victim 
should have protected the children from being exposed to violence.120 A 
majority of states allow public access to civil protection order filings,121 
and survivors may have privacy concerns given the potential for 
discrimination in housing, employment, professional licensure, and 
welfare benefits contexts122 and health, life, and home owner’s 
insurance,123 along with potential immigration consequences.124 This 
Article recognizes that not every abuse survivor may wish to pursue a 
protection order, but when a survivor seeks this court-ordered protection, 
the civil protection order remedy should be available. 
                                                     
118. JUDITH HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 72 (1992); see also Stoever, Stories Absent, supra 
note 60, at 1189–90 (discussing the public nature of domestic violence proceedings and survivors’ 
concerns about revealing personal information about the petitioner or respondent in open court). 
119. See generally Jane K. Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice, 39 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 189 (2016). 
120. DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 76 (2002) (“In 
some states it is considered neglect to permit a child to witness adults fight in the home. When a 
mother calls the police to report she has been beaten, she may be confessing to child neglect.”); see 
also Naomi R. Cahn, Models of Family Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1225, 1244 (1999) 
(identifying that poor women of color are disproportionately targeted by the child welfare system); 
Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child: The Error of Pursuing Battered 
Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 601–02 (2004); Ijeoma Nwabuzor Ogbonnaya 
et al., Domestic Violence and Immigration Status Among Latina Mothers in the Child Welfare System: 
Findings from the National Survey of Child and Adolescent Well-Being II (NSCAW II), 39 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 197 (2015). 
121. Joann Sahl, Can We Forgive Those Who Batter?, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 527, 530 (2016). 
122. Nina W. Tarr, Civil Orders for Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 157, 159–60, 181 (2003) (recommending that lawyers and advocates counsel abuse survivors 
about the potential negative consequences of civil protection orders). 
123. Emily C. Wilson, Stop Re-Victimizing the Victims: A Call for Stronger State Laws Prohibiting 
Insurance Discrimination Against Victims of Domestic Violence, 23 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 413, 416, 430 (2015) (detailing insurance classifications based on domestic violence and the 
need for heightened legal protection); see also Michael J. Sudekum, Homeowner’s Policies and 
Missouri Law Make Recovery for the Domestic Violence Victim/Co-Insured an Olympic Challenge, 
69 UMKC L. REV. 363, 363 (2000). 
124. See Natalie Nanasi, A Fraught Pairing: Immigrant Survivors of Intimate Partner Violence and 
Law Enforcement, in THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY (Jane K. Stoever ed., forthcoming 2019); 
Angelica S. Reina et al., “He Said They’d Deport Me”: Factors Influencing Domestic Violence Help-
Seeking Practices Among Latina Immigrants, 29 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 593 (2013); Jane K. 
Stoever, How New U.S. Immigration Policy Is Hurting Domestic Violence Victims, SAN DIEGO 
UNION-TRIBUNE (July 26, 2018, 4:45 PM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 
opinion/commentary/sd-oe-immigration-deportation-domestic-abuse-20180726-story.html [https:/ 
/perma.cc/UZD6-2Q3M]. 
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II. SURVIVORS SEEKING SAFETY: SERVICE CHALLENGES 
AND RISKS 
Service requirements create access to justice issues, particularly for 
unrepresented individuals with limited means. Access to justice—as a 
movement or as a principle—has many meanings.125 At its core, the 
“access to justice” movement has been about remedying the inability of 
most Americans—including low-income and middle-income 
individuals—to afford counsel for civil legal problems, and the resulting 
“pro se crisis” that overwhelms many civil courts.126 The movement has 
broadened to encompass an expansive range of strategies to meet the legal 
needs of individuals who cannot afford counsel.127 Dimensions of 
accessing justice include: access to information necessary to navigate 
legal proceedings and understand the law,128 fair treatment by judicial 
officers and court staff,129 and access to a personal sense of fairness and 
justice in the proceedings and outcomes of legal matters.130 Achieving 
procedural access by making court processes and rules accessible to the 
majority of individuals who use the courts and remedies—in this case, 
domestic violence courts and litigants—is essential to accessing justice.131 
The petitioner must properly serve the opposing party under the law 
before a judge may enter a legal remedy, but current notice and personal 
service requirements in domestic violence cases are unduly burdensome 
and dangerous for many petitioners. This Part details the current legal 
                                                     
125. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (raising access to justice concerns about the 
“retreat from the principles of citizen access, private enforcement of public policies, and equality of 
litigant treatment in favor of corporate interests and concentrated wealth”). 
126. Aviel, supra note 38, at 2292; Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice: A Roadmap for Reform, 
41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1227, 1228 (2014) (“Over four-fifths of the poor’s legal needs and two- to 
three-fifths of the legal needs of middle-income Americans remain unmet.”). 
127. Aviel, supra note 38, at 2292; Gary Blasi, Framing Access to Justice: Beyond Perceived 
Justice for Individuals, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 913, 914 (2009) (critiquing the traditional narrow 
framing of “access to justice”). 
128. See generally PAUL T. JAEGER ET AL., LIBRARIES, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 
(2015) (identifying access to information as a component of access to justice). 
129. See Paris Baldacci, Assuring Access to Justice: The Role of the Judge in Assisting Pro Se 
Litigants in Litigating Their Cases in New York City’s Housing Court, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & 
ETHICS J. 659, 661–62 (2006). 
130. Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much Justice?, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 865, 870–83 (2004). 
131. See Aviel, supra note 38, at 2292; Steinberg, supra note 38, at 746; Richard Zorza, Some First 
Thoughts on Court Simplification: The Key to Civil Access and Justice Transformation, 61 DRAKE L. 
REV. 845, 847–50; cf. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s 
Courts, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 498, 503 (2015) (cautioning against “informalism” 
and “delegalization” in family law cases and structuring systems in ways that treat litigants as child-
like and “in need of state supervision”). 
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landscape in four areas. Section II.A identifies that some jurisdictions 
require petitioners to notify respondents prior to seeking an ex parte TPO 
and before receiving any court-ordered protection. Section II.B provides 
data from a fifty-state survey showing that all jurisdictions require 
personal service for civil protection orders, and a minority of states make 
alternative service available upon a showing of “diligent efforts” at 
personal service. Section II.C discusses VAWA’s mandate that law 
enforcement serve domestic violence cases for free. Section II.D explores 
how jurisdictions dismiss domestic violence cases for lack of service 
despite the mandate for law enforcement to effectuate service, and some 
jurisdictions’ court rules require judges to do so. 
A. Notice of Ex Parte Temporary Protection Order Requests 
Although the point at which an abused individual attempts to separate 
from an abusive partner is the time of greatest danger, problematically, 
current laws in some states require a domestic violence victim to provide 
advanced notice to the abusive partner before filing for a temporary civil 
protection order. For example, Sierra County, California, requires that the 
petitioner notify the respondent by 10:00 a.m. the day prior to filing for a 
TPO,132 and Orange County, California, requires that the petitioner give 
four-hour notice to the respondent before the court will consider an ex 
parte petition for a temporary domestic violence protection order.133 This 
is typically accomplished by the petitioner or petitioner’s counsel 
telephoning the respondent to alert him or her to the planned request for a 
temporary order and to the date, time, and location at which the 
respondent can appear to object to the request for a TPO.134 Not only does 
providing notice at this stage make it easier for the respondent to then 
evade personal service, it can also endanger abuse survivors by enraging 
respondents before court protection is ordered. 
Such advanced notice alerts an abusive partner to the exact location of 
a victim at a time when the risk of an abusive partner inflicting severe or 
lethal violence is highest and before a court has ordered temporary legal 
protection. An abuse survivor who has escaped to a confidential location 
can now be followed back to a shelter or other undisclosed location. 
Beyond the immediate risk of physical violence against the victim, 
advanced notice may facilitate parental abduction, with the respondent 
                                                     
132. SIERRA CTY. SUP. CT. R. 6.14(a) (providing an exception for “exceptional circumstances”). 
133. ORANGE CTY. SUP. CT. R. 704(A)(1). 
134. Id.; Declaration Re: Notice of Ex Parte Application (Family Law), ORANGE COUNTY CTS., 
https://www.occourts.org/forms/local/l1124.pdf [https://perma.cc/3W2E-QQHQ]. 
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taking children from daycare or school before a court order is in place.135 
Increasingly, advance notice can also result in immigration consequences, 
with the respondent alerting U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) officers to the location of an undocumented abuse survivor, and ICE 
officers making arrests at domestic violence and human trafficking 
court.136 
Judicial officers and abuse victims recognize the inherent danger. As 
the Orange County Court Executive Officer noted, “On the initial request 
of a temporary [civil protection] order, I don’t see how having an alleged 
batterer meet an alleged victim at the courthouse doors is a good idea.”137 
One courthouse advocate recounted overhearing a petitioner provide notice 
and the respondent scream in the background, “We’re all gonna die . . . .”138 
Tragically, petitioner Paula Manuel’s estranged husband Brian Manuel 
killed their four-year-old son after she provided the mandated notice.139 
She stated, “Absolutely, it gave him a heads-up . . . when I called him, it 
just made him more angry.”140 After she gave the four-hour notice, he 
called her incessantly and left threatening messages that warned: “If we 
don’t reconcile, life as we all know it will change.” Brian then picked up 
their child from daycare, as there was no order in place to prevent him 
from doing so, before shooting Paula and killing their son.141 
                                                     
135. Stoever, Parental Abduction, supra note 65, at 876, 883 (identifying that most abducted 
children are taken by a parent and describing child abductions by domestically abusive parents as the 
ultimate abuse). 
136. Steve Coll, When a Day in Court Is a Trap for Immigrants, NEW YORKER (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/when-a-day-in-court-is-a-trap-for-immigrants 
[https://perma.cc/6Q7V-PU3E]; Beth Fertig, Outcry After Immigration Agents Seen at Queens 
Human Trafficking Court, WNYC NEWS (June 16, 2017), https://www.wnyc.org/story/outcry-after-
immigration-agents-come-trafficking-victim-queens-courthouse [https://perma.cc/E7DE-X53D]; 
Katie Mettler, ICE Detains Woman Seeking Domestic Abuse Protection at Texas Courthouse, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/02/16/this-is-
really-unprecedented-ice-detains-woman-seeking-domestic-abuse-protection-at-texas-
courthouse/?utm_term=.526f1cd99905 [https://perma.cc/6TQR-XVAG]; James Queally, ICE Agents 
Make Arrests at Courthouses, Sparking Backlash from Attorneys and State Supreme Court, LA TIMES 
(Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-ice-courthouse-arrests-20170315-
story.html [https://perma.cc/39EH-H48K]. 
137. Rhor, supra note 18 (quoting Alan Slater, Orange County Court Executive Officer).  
138. Id. (quoting advocate Giovanna Businaro’s experience observing petitioners’ anxiety and fear 
and how some abuse survivors decide to forego seeking court protection when they learn of the notice 
requirements). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
12 - Stoever (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2019  8:48 PM 
360 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94:333 
In contrast to these court rules, courts in many other jurisdictions are 
able to issue TPOs on an ex parte basis for limited periods to provide 
immediate protection from violence.142 Jurisdictions including 
Alabama,143 the District of Columbia, and Minnesota require a showing 
of past domestic violence and an imminent threat of harm144 or 
“immediate and present danger of domestic abuse”145 for an ex parte TPO. 
Depending on the state, a hearing for a “permanent” protection order must 
be set within one to three weeks,146 so the ex parte TPO is of limited 
duration. While the temporary order provides immediate safety remedies, 
determinations of possession of property, financial awards, longer-term 
custody, and therapeutic treatment remedies are typically reserved for the 
noticed hearing.147 
Multiple states have determined that issuing TPOs without providing 
notice to the respondent does not violate due process.148 For example, in 
the Minnesota case, Baker v. Baker,149 the respondent challenged the ex 
parte temporary order that awarded temporary child custody to his 
estranged wife and required him to vacate their residence. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court determined that requiring pre-deprivation notice to an 
                                                     
142. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-3 (2018); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-6304 (West 2018); IND. 
CODE § 34-26-5-2 (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2018); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2950 
(2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-102 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-924 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 33.020 (2017) (all of the foregoing permitting a temporary order to be granted with or without notice 
to the respondent, and not specifying danger of immediate harm); N.H. REV. STAT. § 173-B:3 (2018); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8–8.1-3 (2018); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-103 (West 2018); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 1104 (2018) (all of the foregoing permitting temporary orders to be issued ex parte, without 
notice to the respondent, upon motion or findings that the respondent has abused the petitioner or 
petitioner’s children, or both); D.C. CODE § 16-1004(b) (2019); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.020 
(2018); WIS. STAT. § 813.12(3)(b) (2017) (all of the foregoing not requiring notice be given to the 
respondent before a temporary restraining order is entered against the respondent named in the 
petition). 
143. United States v. Hamm, 134 Fed. App’x 328, 330 (11th Cir. 2005) (Alabama’s Protection 
from Abuse Act allows for the issuance of an ex parte protection order as “necessary to protect the 
plaintiff or minor children from abuse, or the immediate and present danger of abuse to the plaintiff 
or minor children, upon good cause shown in an ex parte proceeding”). 
144. D.C. CODE § 16-1004(b)(1) (requiring a showing that “the safety or welfare of the petitioner 
or a household member is immediately endangered by the respondent”). 
145. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7)(a) (2018). 
146. Hamm, 134 Fed. App’x at 330; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.110(a) (2018) (permitting 
TPOs to last for twenty days); D.C. CODE § 16–1004(b)(2) (stating that an initial TPO is issued for 
two weeks). 
147. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340-46 (West 2018). 
148. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 286 (Minn. 1992); Ferris v. Ferris, 12th Dist. Clermont No. 
CA2005–05–043, 2006-Ohio-878 (finding good cause for issuing an ex parte TPO); State v. Karas, 
108 Wash. App. 692, 698, 32 P.3d 1016, 1019 (2001) (determining that courts have the authority to 
issue ex parte TPOs pending hearing). 
149. 494 N.W.2d 282. 
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alleged abusive partner would endanger the victim, thereby defeating the 
Domestic Abuse Act’s150 purpose of providing immediate protection to 
domestic violence victims.151 Because the Act offers relief to persons at 
risk of ongoing domestic violence, the court reasoned that ex parte 
protection is “central to the substantive relief provided for under the Act,” 
and that requiring pre-deprivation notice was not only inappropriate, it 
could actually precipitate increased violence.152 
B. Personal Service for Domestic Violence Remedies 
Across the United States, personal service is expected in domestic 
violence protection order cases and fulfills notice requirements.153 Some 
state family law codes go even further and provide heightened procedural 
requirements for domestic violence remedies, explicitly exempting these 
remedies from alternate pathways to service.154 For example, when 
Petitioner Paula Manuel sought a domestic violence protection order in 
California against her estranged husband, she was unable to achieve 
personal service.155 When she told the judge about her fears for her safety, 
based in part on his work as a security guard and ownership of multiple 
guns, and that she believed her husband was deliberately evading service, 
the judge responded that there was nothing he could do under the law until 
her husband was personally served.156 
                                                     
150. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01. 
151. Baker, 494 N.W.2d at 286. 
152. Id. 
153. ALA. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(1); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(d); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.1; ARK. R. CIV. P. 4(d); CAL. 
FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018); COLO. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-57(a) (2019); DEL. 
FAM. CT. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.031 
(2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-4(e)(7) (2018); HAW. R. FAM. CT. 4(d)(1); IDAHO R. CIV. P. (4)(d)(1); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-203 (2018); IND. R. CIV. P. 4.1; IOWA. R. CIV. P. 1.305(1); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 60-303(d)(1)(A) (2018); KY. R. CIV. P. 4.04(2); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 1232–34; ME. R. CIV. 
P. 4(d); MD. R. CIV. P. 3-124(b); MASS. R. CIV. P. 4(d); MICH. CT. R. 2.105(A); MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.03(a); 
MISS. R. CIV. P. 4(d); MO. ANN. STAT. § 506.150 (West 2018); MONT. R. CIV. P. 4(e); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-508.01 (2018); NEV. R. CIV. P. 4(d); N.H. REV. STAT. § 510:2 (2018); N.J. R. CIV. P. 4:4-4; N.M. R. 
CIV. P. 1-004(F); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2018); N.C. R. CIV. P. 4(j)(1)(a); N.D. R. CIV. P. 
4(d)(1); OHIO R. CIV. P. 4.1(B); 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2004 (West 2018); OR. R. CIV. P. 7(D)(2)(a), 
(3)(A)(1); PA. R. CIV. P. NO. 402; R.I. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); S.C. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 15-6-4(d)(8) (2018); TENN. R. CIV. P. 4.04(1); TEX. R. CIV. P. 106(a)(1); UTAH R. CIV. P. (4)(d)(1)(A); 
VT. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.02-296(1) (2018); WASH. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(2); W. VA. R. CIV. 
P. 4(d)(1); WIS. STAT. § 8.01.11(1) (2018); WYO. R. CIV. P. 4(e). 
154. CAL. FAM. CODE § 243. 
155. Rhor, supra note 18.  
156. Id. 
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Less than one-third of states explicitly make available alternative forms 
of service in domestic violence cases when personal service had been 
unsuccessful. These states include Alabama,157 Alaska,158 California,159 
Illinois,160 Michigan,161 Minnesota,162 Nevada,163 New Jersey,164 New 
York,165 Rhode Island,166 Washington,167 West Virginia,168 Wisconsin,169 
and the District of Columbia.170 
                                                     
157. ALA. CODE § 30-5-7 (2018); ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1), (e)(1). Service may be completed 
through personal delivery by a process server or by certified mail. A court may, on motion, order 
service to be made by publication when a defendant avoids service or for failure of service due to 
unknown present location. Id. 
158. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(e). 
159. CAL. FAM. CODE § 6340(a)(2) (West 2018) (amended in 2018 to permit alternative service). 
160. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-206(a) (2018); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/103 (2018). Service on a 
member of respondent’s household or by publication shall be adequate if petitioner has made all 
reasonable efforts to accomplish actual service personally on respondent and respondent cannot be 
found and petitioner files an affidavit or sworn testimony as to those efforts. Id. 
161. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950(18) (West 2018) (requiring personal service or service 
by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested). 
162. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2018). Personal service attempts may be followed by service through 
a one-week published notice when the petitioner files an affidavit concerning the unsuccessful 
personal service attempts and stating that a copy has been mailed to the last known residence. Id. 
163. NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.030 (2017). The appropriate law enforcement agency shall personally 
serve the respondent. When a current address is unknown or the agency has made at least two 
unsuccessful attempts at the current place of employment, service may be completed by delivery to 
the respondent’s current place of employment and by mailing a copy to the current place of 
employment. Id. 
164. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25–28 (West 2018) (initially requiring personal service, but permitting 
courts to order “other appropriate substituted service” if personal service cannot be effected). 
165. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 153(b) (McKinney 2019) (requiring police officers to attempt personal 
service); id. § 826 (permitting courts to make an order for substituted service). 
166. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8–8.1–3 (2018). The order shall be personally served by a deputy sheriff or 
certified constable. If either have been unable to personally serve the respondent after diligent efforts, 
the court may order an alternative method of service, including, but not limited to, certified and regular 
mail at the last known address or place of employment, leaving copies at the dwelling with a person 
of suitable age, or by publication in a newspaper for two consecutive weeks. Id.  
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.050 (2018). 
Except as provided in RCW 26.50.085 and 26.50.123, personal service shall be made upon the 
respondent not less than five court days prior to the hearing. If timely personal service cannot be 
made, the court shall set a new hearing date and shall either require an additional attempt at 
obtaining personal service or permit service by publication as provided in RCW 26.50.085 or 
service by mail as provided in RCW 26.50.123. The court shall not require more than two 
attempts at obtaining personal service and shall permit service by publication or by mail unless 
the petitioner requests additional time to attempt personal service. If the court permits service by 
publication or by mail, the court shall set the hearing date not later than twenty-four days from 
the date of the order. 
Id. 
168. W. VA. CODE § 48-27-501 (2018). Unsuccessful attempts at personal service may be followed 
by service through a published notice and simultaneous first class mail of the court order to the last 
known address. Id. 
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The majority of states that permit alternative service do so only when 
a petitioner files a motion or affidavit requesting alternative service and 
following a judicial determination that the petitioner made diligent efforts 
to attempt personal service and judicial approval of an alternate method 
best suited to accomplish actual notice.171 Many petitioners do not know 
that requesting alternative service is possible, and the process presents 
logistical hurdles.172 
C. VAWA’s Promise of Service 
Since 2000, VAWA has required law enforcement agencies to serve 
protection order petitions and court orders on respondents without 
charging fees to petitioners.173 Significantly, police and sheriff 
departments that charge for service of protection orders jeopardize their 
federal grant funding and may be noncompliant with their own state laws 
and policies.174 The broad mandate for accomplishing service does not 
suggest the number of attempts at personal service law enforcement 
should make, that law enforcement must make reasonable efforts, or 
standards for communicating with petitioners; this important 
advancement remains an imperfect solution due to its drafting and 
execution. 
While the requirement that law enforcement attempt service for free is 
an extremely important mechanism for achieving service in some cases, 
“[g]iven sheer volume, over-worked law enforcement personnel may have 
                                                     
169. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 813.125(2)(a) (West 2018) (permitting petitioners to file affidavits with 
the court about private process servers and law enforcement being unable to achieve personal service, 
and then permitting judges to authorize alternative service methods). 
170. D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i), (D)(i)–(iv). A respondent shall be personally 
served. If the court determines that, after diligent effort, service has been unsuccessful, it may permit 
alternative service through delivery to respondent’s employer, registered or certified mail with return 
receipt requested, or such other manner as the court, in its discretion, may deem just and reasonable, 
including electronic service. Id. 
171. See, e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1) (“reasonable diligence”); ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(e)(1) 
(“diligent inquiry”); ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 4.1(k), (l)(1)(A)(i) (“reasonably diligent efforts”); COLO. R. CIV. 
P. 4(f) (“due diligence”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 49.041(1) (West 2018) (“diligent search and inquiry”); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-316(A)(1)(b) (2018) (“diligence”). 
172. Supra note 157 and 160; see also ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1) (requiring that the petitioner file 
an affidavit to seek service by publication); infra Section IV.C. 
173. Supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
174. HENRY & PLAYER, supra note 14.  
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little incentive to doggedly locate and personally serve a batterer.”175 The 
brief timeframe for service in domestic violence cases often means that 
law enforcement officers do not make multiple service attempts.176 Many 
counties still utilize rudimentary methods for transferring protection order 
paperwork to police departments,177 such as using mail, couriers, or pick-
up boxes from which deputies retrieve service packets, as opposed to 
instantaneous email or electronic delivery. Officers typically fail to 
communicate with petitioners about their efforts at achieving service.178 
A police sergeant overseeing a two-detective team charged with serving 
domestic violence petitions and orders in a major metropolitan area 
identifies challenges: “There are people who can’t be found, don’t want 
to be found, they’re hiding in the bathroom, moved to 
Minnesota . . . . Police cannot knock down a door to serve an 
order . . . there is a limit.”179 
Through pragmatic measures, law enforcement can better fulfill the 
federal requirement for law enforcement to effectuate service in domestic 
violence cases. Law enforcement and courts can improve processes so that 
officers timely receive pleadings and summons for service, immediately 
begin efforts at service, make multiple service attempts, and communicate 
with petitioners about service. 
In contrast to pro se litigants’ reliance on law enforcement for service, 
higher-resourced individuals and their attorneys often utilize detectives or 
private process servers to accomplish personal service. Whereas police 
and sheriffs attempting service will generally only make one service 
attempt, private services can be employed to conduct stakeouts and 
attempt service at multiple locations multiple times. These private agents 
appear in plainclothes, rather than in uniform, and do not drive police cars, 
making it more likely that the respondent will answer the door.180 
Resources and counsel do not guarantee service, however, especially 
                                                     
175. Mary Schouvieller, Leaping Without Looking: Chapter 142’s Impact on Ex Parte Protection 
Orders and the Movement Against Domestic Violence in Minnesota, 14 LAW & INEQ. 593, 630 (1996). 
176. Id. 
177. Rhor, supra note 18. 
178. In my experience litigating domestic violence cases in six states over nearly two decades, law 
enforcement rarely communicates with petitioners about service. Instead, law enforcement commonly 
instructs petitioners and counsel to check with the court about whether a proof of service has been filed. 
179. Singer, supra note 16. 
180. These observations are based on my experience litigating domestic violence cases in six 
jurisdictions over nearly two decades.  
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when respondents successfully evade service.181 One example of a highly 
visible individual with resources whose case was dismissed for lack of 
service is former Miss USA and Real Housewives of Atlanta reality 
television star Kenya Moore, whose case against her ex-boyfriend was 
dismissed even as he persisted in harassing her.182 
D. Court Rules Mandating Case Dismissal for Lack of Service 
Currently, if a petitioner is unable to personally serve the respondent, 
judges may reissue the TPO; however, some counties’ local rules require 
that petitions be dismissed after one, two, or three hearing dates by which 
service has not been achieved, even though the survivor still needs 
protection.183 Even in counties where no such local rule exists, judges 
commonly dismiss civil protection order cases after only two TPO 
reissuances if the respondent has not been personally served,184 leaving 
petitioners without remedy and instructing petitioners to re-file and restart 
the entire process if the respondent reappears. 
Dismissing domestic violence cases for lack of service and leaving 
abuse survivors without protection is problematic and dangerous because 
many abuse perpetrators intentionally evade service or are difficult or 
impossible to find, yet continue stalking, threatening, and abusing 
petitioners and present ongoing danger to the parties’ children. Even when 
a domestic violence order has not yet been personally served on the 
respondent, it provides important safety protections that schools, 
workplaces, and others observe—thereby preventing respondents from 
abducting children from daycares and schools and from coming into 
protected locations, such as the petitioner’s workplace. 
                                                     
181. See infra notes 191–196 and accompanying text, detailing two client examples for which my 
Domestic Violence Clinic spent over $4,000 in one case and over $2,000 in another case on private 
investigators and process servers to attempt to locate and serve respondents. 
182. LIEBER & GALPERIN LLP, supra note 15. 
183. Under California local court rules, in San Francisco and Alameda Counties, the court will 
dismiss the case after three attempts at service; in Butte County, the case is dismissed after only one 
attempt, and other counties, including San Mateo County, permit two attempts at personal service 
before the court dismisses the case. See, e.g., BUTTE COUNTY R. 16.4 (“If a responding party fails to 
appear at a hearing, the moving party must submit proof of timely service to the Court; otherwise, the 
matter will be taken off calendar.”); SAN MATEO COUNTY R. 5.7(E) (presuming that the court shall 
dismiss a case after two hearing dates without service). 
184. Minute Orders of case examples are on file with the Author. 
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E. Case Studies Illustrating Danger of Current Procedural Rules 
Current notice and personal service requirements create additional 
impediments in an already challenging legal process for domestic 
violence victims seeking legal protection, including increased safety risks, 
traumatic emotional and mental triggers, financial and time-related 
constraints, and the inability to receive necessary court-ordered 
protection. This Section explores the logistical, financial, and safety-
related challenges of the procedural rules just discussed. 
The service process itself often creates danger for victims and their 
family members and friends who attempt to assist with service. Rebecca 
Griego’s sister, Rachel Griego, recounted the difficulty of trying to locate 
a man who was able to evade law enforcement’s service efforts while 
continually threatening and stalking her sister. Jonathan had no place of 
employment, had stolen from his roommates, was on the run, and used 
pay-as-you-go phones so he could not be tracked.185 Given these factors, 
the police were unable to locate and serve Jonathan. 
Rachel Griego recalled, “In short, we were left to find him ourselves in 
order to serve him, which, in and of itself, put our very lives in danger.”186 
The Domestic Violence Unit judge suggested that the sisters post 
information on Craigslist to help with their search, and told them, “Good 
luck.”187 The judge expressed that because of the requirement for personal 
service, there was nothing more the judge could do to protect Rebecca 
from abuse.188 Jonathan murdered Rebecca the day before the next 
scheduled court date on her protection order request.189 
The personal service requirement often creates extreme delays in those 
domestic violence cases that are not dismissed, all the while jeopardizing 
safety.190 In one of my domestic violence clinic’s cases, we hired a private 
process server to attempt service on a respondent in coordination with the 
police.191 His roommate said he was not home, and the respondent fled 
with the parties’ baby. The respondent, who had threatened to take their 
baby and change her name, texted our client: “Lose this number.”192 He 
                                                     
185. Perry, supra note 7. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. H.R. Rep. 60-6357, Reg. Sess., at 3 (Wash. 2008); S.B. Rep. 60-6357, Reg. Sess., at 1 (Wash. 2008).  
190. Schouvieller, supra note 175, at 630.  
191. Court pleadings, referenced exhibits, and invoices totaling over $4,000 for private process 
servers and private investigators are on file with the Author. 
192. Exhibits are on file with the Author. 
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spent the next seven months on the run with the infant, evading service 
and police detection.193 Our clinic and client spent the entirety of that time 
searching for our client’s baby, attempting to track the respondent through 
welfare and food stamp payments and the baby’s medical records, and 
returning to court every three weeks to seek an extension of the TPO.194 
Finally, the respondent and child were found after I went on local news 
with our client, and the mother and child were reunited.195 
Nearly twenty months after our client first filed for a civil protection 
order, after further court delays, the hearing occurred and she was awarded 
her permanent order. Our clinic was determined to recover her baby and 
spent more than $4,000 on private process servers and private 
investigators alone, in addition to the hardships to our client of missed 
work, transportation expense, and emotional trauma; the attorney and 
student intern time; and the judicial and clerical resources. 
The following example further illustrates entwined difficulties 
attendant to mandating pre-TPO notice and personal service in domestic 
violence cases, and how pre-TPO notice endangers survivors and their 
children and makes achieving personal service more difficult by alerting 
respondents to evade service. 
We represented Karen, who had three young children with her ex-
boyfriend, in her civil protection order and child support cases. Jason 
viciously abused Karen during their seven-year relationship, including 
beating her so severely that she had a miscarriage. When Karen first 
sought representation, we learned that she had been unable to receive a 
protective order in the past because she could not serve Jason. The judge 
had dismissed her two prior filings and TPOs after two continuances, each 
for lack of personal service,196 yet Jason kept threatening and abusing her, 
and Karen feared he would take their children from school. 
We felt compelled to help Karen and her children, aware that service 
would be an issue. When we filed a new petition, the judge required us to 
provide four-hour notice to Jason for the new TPO pursuant to Orange 
County court rules, refusing to find “good cause” for waiving notice 
despite Jason’s threat of child abduction; history of violence; criminal 
record that included drug, gang, and weapon-related offenses; and prior 
success evading service. Jason responded to our notice by texting that he 
                                                     
193. Pleadings and court orders are on file with the Author. 
194. Court filings and orders are on file with the Author. 
195. Authorities Believe Baby Girl Allegedly Abducted in 2013 Is Still in San Bernardino County, CBS 
L.A. (Oct. 3, 2014, 11:04 PM), https://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2014/10/03/authorities-believe-baby-girl-
allegedly-abducted-in-2013-is-still-in-san-bernardino-county/ [https://perma.cc/W3L4-LAMA]. 
196. The court’s Minute Order is on file with the clinic. 
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was not coming to court. The pre-TPO notice alerted Jason that we would 
be searching for him for service. 
Jason did not have stable housing or employment, so my students 
undertook extensive efforts to locate him through social media, and we 
were eventually able to have a private investigator serve Jason at a bar 
after midnight. Following a default hearing at which Jason failed to 
appear, the judge noted how brave Karen was for pursuing relief and said, 
“I want you to know, you have the respect of the Court.” The protection 
order then had to be personally served, which proved impossible for many 
months. 
The pre-TPO notice rule and personal service requirements together 
cause abuse survivors anxiety and fear. Repeated court dates also 
paradoxically provide opportunities to stalk petitioners, as abuse survivors 
must keep returning to court at set dates and times. Across jurisdictions, 
abuse survivors who are most vulnerable to high-level abuse are left to 
navigate court processes and service attempts on their own and report 
feeling fearful and at a loss.197 
Part III will explain the legal basis for permitting alternative service for 
domestic violence cases, and Part IV will address the problematic historic 
reasons for the differential treatment of domestic violence cases before 
Part V recommends remedies.  
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EXCEPTIONALISM AND DUE 
PROCESS 
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution protects a respondent’s right to notice, which is ensured 
through service of process.198 Significantly, a petitioner also has a 
constitutionally protected interest in having a hearing on the merits of his 
or her claim “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”199 The 
petitioner’s due process right of access to courts has received scant 
attention in scholarship.200 Section III.A addresses the petitioner’s right 
while noting that the respondent does not have a constitutionally protected 
interest in avoiding claims or evading service of process. Section III.B 
details the respondent’s rights and the evolving notice-giving standards 
articulated by the Supreme Court. 
                                                     
197. See Perry, supra note 7; Rhor, supra note 18. 
198. Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999). 
199. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437 (1982). 
200. See John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to 
a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005). 
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A. The Petitioner’s Right to a Hearing 
The Due Process Clause applies both to “defendants hoping to protect 
their property” and to “plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.”201 
Despite this dual application, Judith Herman noted the longstanding lack 
of attention to petitioners’ rights, writing, “The legal system is designed 
to protect men from the superior power of the state but not to protect 
women or children from the superior power of men. It therefore provides 
strong guarantees for the rights of the accused but essentially no 
guarantees for the rights of the victim.”202 
The Due Process Clause requires that court rules allow access to a 
hearing at a “meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.”203 As the 
Court in Mullane explained, once the state creates a remedy, it cannot 
deprive the petitioner of a hearing on that claim without due process of 
law.204 If procedural rules are so stringent as to prevent petitioners from 
achieving service and having their cases heard, as commonly occurs in 
domestic violence protection order cases, petitioners are denied the right 
of access to the courts. 
The Court in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.205 stated that rules must 
not create an “unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be 
terminated,”206 but this is precisely what happens when domestic violence 
petitions are dismissed for failure to personally serve the respondent. The 
jurisdictions with rules that automatically terminate domestic violence 
petitions for lack of service contravene the Due Process Clause, which 
prevents rules from terminating a claim when the petitioner’s failure to 
comply with the rules is “due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, 
or any fault” of the petitioner.207 
                                                     
201. Logan, 455 U.S. at 429. 
202. HERMAN, supra note 118, at 72. 
203. Logan, 445 U.S. at 437; Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). 
204. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15; see also Logan, 455 U.S. at 429 (“The Court traditionally has 
held that the Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either as 
defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances.”); Boddie 
v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971) (holding that, under the Due Process Clause, states cannot 
limit the rights to adjudicatory procedures when doing so is “the equivalent of denying them an 
opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right”). 
205. 455 U.S. 422 (1982). 
206. Id. at 434. 
207. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 
U.S. 197, 212 (1958). 
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Significantly, respondents do not have a due process interest in 
avoiding claims against them or evading service of process. Procedural 
rules must instead protect all rights at stake, including both the 
respondent’s and petitioner’s rights, and strike a reasonable balance in 
doing so. 
B. The Respondent’s Notice Rights 
A court must have both personal jurisdiction and proper service of 
process to have power to rule on a dispute.208 Due process demands that 
the respondent is given proper notice and the opportunity to be heard 
before the court exercises jurisdiction.209 If the respondent does not 
receive proper notice, the court’s power to adjudicate the matter is 
imperfect, and its judgments are vulnerable to collateral attack.210 
In many areas of the law, standards for notice-giving have developed 
and evolved to ensure defendants have opportunities to participate in 
proceedings, particularly as the “constitutionally permissible bases for 
exercising jurisdiction over the defendant’s person or property have 
expanded.”211 Namely, given technological advances and how people live 
and interact, service of process via electronic means is often the most 
expedient method of actually providing notice and ensuring justice.212 
Service of process in domestic violence cases, however, has not evolved 
with technology and with due process doctrine more generally. 
1. Evolving Notice-Giving Standards 
Regarding the historical evolution of service of process, in Pennoyer v. 
Neff 213 in 1877, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether the federal 
Constitution requires particular methods of service and found personal 
service to be the most preferable means, but permitted constructive 
service in limited settings, such as permitting service by publication for 
unreachable in-state defendants.214 During the past century, due process 
                                                     
208. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
209. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
210. Smith v. United States, 403 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1968); see also JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 173–74 (5th ed. 2015). 
211. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 210, at 174; cf. Chaplin v. Superior Court, 253 P. 954 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1927) (finding notice not satisfied even when the defendant had knowledge of the lawsuit, 
evaded service, and had the lawsuit brought to his attention through media publicity and personal 
correspondence). 
212. Infra notes 387–389 and accompanying text. 
213. 95 U.S. 714, 729 (1877). 
214. Id. at 729, 733–34. 
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doctrine has evolved from requiring actual notice to permitting methods 
that instead provide a likelihood that service will give notice. For 
example, forty years after Pennoyer, the Court in McDonald v. Mabee215 
explicitly authorized other service methods, such as leaving notice with 
the defendant’s co-resident at their home.216 
The current general standard for notice, declared by the Court in 
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., is “notice reasonably 
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their 
objections.”217 The Court expanded methods of service consistent with the 
“reasonably calculated” standard articulated in Mullane218 and has since 
affirmed that the Constitution requires service methods that are likely to 
achieve actual notice, regardless of whether they in fact provide notice.219 
The Court took into account practical difficulties when it declared: “A 
construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or 
impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified. Against this 
interest of the State we must balance the individual interest sought to be 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”220 
Courts encourage flexibility concerning the mandate of reasonableness 
under the circumstances of the case,221 recognizing that the notice and 
opportunity for hearing should be “appropriate to the nature of the 
case.”222 The U.S. Supreme Court has also maintained that due process 
                                                     
215. 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917). 
216. Id. (“To dispense with personal service the substitute that is most likely to reach the defendant 
is the least that ought to be required if substantial justice is to be done.”). 
217. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950) (permitting service 
by mail in the case in question concerning common-trust fund proceedings). 
218. Id. at 315. 
219. See, e.g., Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168 (2002) (affirming the Mullane 
standard for the sufficiency of notice); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 
705, (1988) (identifying personal service or substituted service as acceptable means of serving a 
foreign party); Polansky v. Richardson, 351 F. Supp. 1066, 1069 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (explaining that 
actual receipt of process is not the test for due process, instead it is whether “reasonable steps had 
been taken to give [the adverse party] notice” (alteration in original)). Note also that parties can 
knowingly and voluntarily waive notice, such as through waiver by contract (in the absence of 
substantially unequal bargaining power between the parties or a contract of adhesion). See, e.g., D. 
H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972) (finding that due process is not violated by the 
inclusion of a cognovits clause in a promissory note); Nat’l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 
311 (1964) (permitting service of process upon a party’s designated agent). 
220. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313–14. 
221. See id. at 314–15. 
222. In re Jesusa V., 85 P.3d 2, 9 (Cal. 2004). 
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requirements must be flexible and particular to the situation.223 Although 
personal service guarantees actual notice of the pendency of a legal action, 
“less rigorous notice procedures have enjoyed substantial acceptance 
throughout our legal history.”224 Furthermore, outside of domestic 
violence contexts, when the defendant has actual knowledge of the case 
even though formal notice has not been perfected, many courts accept this 
knowledge as sufficient.225 
2. Alternative Service Options Across Other Areas of Law 
The U.S. Supreme Court and lower courts have acknowledged the 
prevalence of alternate methods of service. Beyond traditional personal 
service, generally applicable state and federal civil procedure statutes 
commonly provide for “substituted” or “constructive” service, such as by 
mailing notice to the defendant, leaving notice at the defendant’s home, 
electronic delivery, posting notice, or publishing notice in a newspaper in 
the manner prescribed by statute. In federal court matters, for example, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(B) authorizes leaving process at 
the defendant’s usual place of abode.226 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 4(d) authorizes first-class mail as a substitute for personal service 
and even encourages its use to save the expense of personal service.227 
Procedural rules and courts permit various methods of service of 
process across multiple contexts.228 For example, service by certified mail 
                                                     
223.  Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such 
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“Due process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
224. Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 449 (1982). 
225. Nowell v. Nowell, 384 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1967); Clemones v. Ala. Power Co., 250 F. Supp. 
433 (N.D. Ga. 1966); cf. Md. State Firemen’s Ass’n v. Chaves, 166 F.R.D. 353 (D. Md. 1996); 
Chilcote v. Shertzer, 372 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. Wis. 1974); Espindola v. Nunez, 245 Cal. Rptr. 596 (Ct. 
App. 1988) (In a civil suit for negligence, breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy, service was proper 
where the process server attempted three times to serve the defendant personally at his home and then, 
on the fourth try, left copies with the defendant’s wife, a codefendant in the action. The court focuses 
on legislative intent, which provides for a liberal reading of the due diligence requirement.). 
226. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e)(2)(B); see, e.g., Karlsson v. Rabinowitz, 318 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1963) 
(determining that service delivered to the defendant’s wife in Maryland was proper even though the 
husband-defendant had moved to Arizona with no intent to return to Maryland). 
227. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d). 
228. See, e.g., Lewis v. Madej, No. 15cv2676, 2015 WL 6442255 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2015) 
(trademark infringement case permitting substituted service); Bein v. Brechtel-Jochim Grp, Inc., 8 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 351 (Ct. App. 1992) (in a corporate breach of contract action, permitting service to the 
gate guard for defendants who lived in a gated community). 
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is sufficient for license revocation229 and mechanic’s liens,230 to 
designated licensing agencies,231 and in general civil suits.232 Service by 
posting a summons and complaint on the residence in dispute is 
acceptable in unlawful detainer cases for a landlord to have “a summary, 
expeditious way of getting back his property when a tenant fails to pay 
the rent or refuses to vacate the premises at the end of his tenancy.”233 
Service by publication suffices for personal injury cases234 and to 
terminate parental rights.235 In general, federal requirements for service 
on businesses are broad and allow for multiple employees to receive 
documents to satisfy the service requirement236 or for the Secretary of 
State to receive service.237 Service abroad on a foreign business entity can 
be accomplished in every method under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(h) other than personal delivery.238 
Each jurisdiction imposes its own statutory requirements for service of 
process that extend beyond the minimum requirement of due process. 
Some state statutes include catch-all provisions for alternate service 
                                                     
229. See, e.g., McIntee v. State Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 279 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. 1979) (holding that 
delivery of a license revocation notice via certified mail to a respondent’s postbox of five years was 
sufficient to constitute “constructive delivery” of notice despite respondent’s failure to pick up his mail). 
230. See, e.g., Har-Ned Lumber Co. v. Amagineers, Inc., 436 N.W.2d 811, 814–15 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989) (concluding that service of a mechanic’s lien statement via certified mail was timely despite 
recipient’s failure to respond to the notice). 
231. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10151.5 (West 2018) (authorizing nonresident real estate licensees 
to be served through the Bureau of Real Estate). 
232. D.C. R. CIV. P. 4(c)(3)–(4) (permitting service by registered or certified mail in civil cases); 
see also Ellard v. Conway, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Ct. App. 2001) (providing an example of a fraud 
action permitting service by mail). 
233. Bd. of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Ham, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 839, 899 (Ct. 
App. 2013) (stating that the expeditious recovery of real property “is not served by a protracted inquiry 
into all sources of information regarding the tenant’s location before posting and mailing at the one 
address of which the landlord is certain”); Nork v. Pac. Coast Med. Enters., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 734 
(Ct. App. 1977). 
234. See, e.g., Elliott v. Franklin, No. CX-92-1968, 1993 WL 129633, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 
27, 1993) (finding service by publication in a personal injury case adequate when a respondent 
purposely avoided service pursuant to MINN. R. CIV. P. 4.04). 
235. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26 (West 2018). 
236. An employee capable of receiving service need only have the authority and responsibility to 
render it likely he or she will know what to do with the papers received to be deemed a “managing or 
general agent” for the purposes of Rule 4(h)(1)(B). Baade v. Price, 175 F.R.D. 403, 405 (D.D.C. 
1997) (holding that the person served must have some measure of discretion in operating some phase 
of defendant’s business or in management of a given office); Montclair Elecs., Inc. v. Electra/Midland 
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
237. See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17.026 (West 2018); TEX. R. CIV. P. 103. 
238. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. OPEC, 766 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (antitrust case). 
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through electronic service239 and other means that are increasingly 
relevant based on advances in technology and the evolving ways in which 
people live and communicate. For example, during the past two decades, 
electronic service has been permitted in trademark infringement,240 
bankruptcy,241 class action securities fraud,242 international business 
affairs,243 and general domestic business cases.244 An emerging trend in 
New York, the District of Columbia, and some other jurisdictions permits 
email and Facebook service in civil cases, including family law cases, 
when traditional service proves impracticable and the party also attempts 
service by mail upon the last known address.245 Reported cases involving 
this method of service include divorce246 and international child custody 
matters.247 
                                                     
239. See, e.g., CAL. R. OF CT. 2.251(a) (“When a document may be served by mail, express mail, 
overnight delivery, or fax transmission, the document may be served electronically under Code of 
Civil Procedure section 1010.6 and the rules in this chapter.”). 
240. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int’l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). 
241. In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. 713 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2000); In re Xacur, 216 B.R. 
187 (Bankr. S. D. Tex. 1997) (permitting service via email and posting the text of the complaint on a 
web page). 
242. Greebel v. FTP Software, 939 F. Supp. 57 (D. Mass. 1996). 
243. AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG, 780 F.3d 420, 428–29 (1st Cir. 2015) (approving service 
on “elusive international” defendant’s counsel); Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1013, 1016 (determining 
email service to be sufficient with both the Constitution and Rule 4(f)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure where the defendant had structured its business so that it could only be reached by email); 
In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. at 715–18 (where an international defendant-debtor had 
refused to provide a permanent address, but did provide a permanent facsimile number and email 
address, the court ordered service to be effected by facsimile, email, and regular mail to the 
defendant’s last known address). 
244. Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443–44 (Civ. Ct. 2008) (finding service 
by email appropriate when conventional service was impracticable). 
245. Supra notes 30–31; see, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIO. R. 5(a)(3) (permitting judges to allow 
multiple forms of alternative service). 
246. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 706–08 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (relying on Rio Props., 284 
F.3d 1007 and In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., 245 B.R. 713, and finding that email service of process 
satisfies the requirement set forth in Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 
(1950)). In Hollow, the first case to authorize e-service under rule 308(5) of the New York Civil 
Practice Law and Rules, email service was acceptable in a divorce case when sent to a defendant that 
had been living in Saudi Arabia for two years and had only communicated with the plaintiff through 
email, and other methods of service were impracticable. The court allowed e-service, in combination 
with service through international registered and standard mail. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 706–08. 
247. Ferrarese v. Shaw, 164 F. Supp. 3d 361, 364, 367–68 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (in international 
custody and child abduction case, allowing service by email and Facebook, provided petitioner also 
effected service by certified mail, on defendant’s last known address, and on defendant’s sister). 
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C. Due Process for Domestic Violence 
Because protection orders place restrictions on the respondent’s 
actions—such as prohibiting the respondent from communicating with or 
being near the petitioner and parties’ children,248 ordering the respondent 
to vacate a shared residence,249 and awarding temporary child custody and 
financial support250—questions arise about whether alternative service 
sufficiently protects respondents’ due process rights. 
Although jurisdictions generally require personal service for domestic 
violence cases, due process does not demand personal service. Section 1 
examines how service of process methods already prescribed in codes of 
civil procedure, which are designed to give reasonable notice of an action 
to the respondent, fulfill due process requirements in the domestic 
violence context. Section III.C.1 applies the Mathews v. Eldridge251 
factors,252 which require consideration of the domestic violence context, 
balance of harms, and the governmental interest in providing protection 
from abuse. Notably, respondents can challenge domestic violence 
protection orders by motioning the court to modify or vacate orders, so a 
respondent who feels unfairly or unduly burdened by an order issued 
following alternative service can still petition the court. Finally, 
Section III.C.2 addresses questions of enforcement and procedural justice. 
1.  Mathews v. Eldridge Analysis 
Due process requirements strive to ensure the respondent has actual 
notice of the domestic violence protection order hearing and the 
opportunity to appear in court. Even though personal service is preferable, 
the due process adequacy of other forms of notice for domestic violence 
protection order cases is a separate inquiry and can be evaluated under the 
Mathews factors.253 
                                                     
248. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (2019) (listing forms of relief); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.50.060 (2018) (same). 
249. See Margaret E. Johnson, A Home with Dignity: Domestic Violence and Property Rights, 2014 
BYU L. REV. 1 (2014). 
250. Stoever, supra note 74, at 364–65 (2011) (identifying that some protection order statutes lack 
financial relief, and discussing judicial reluctance to address financial remedies, even when statutorily 
enumerated, in protection order cases). 
251. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
252. Id. at 321. 
253. Id. 
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In Mathews v. Eldridge, the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether 
individuals have a statutorily granted property right in Social Security 
benefits.254 The Court held that terminating such benefits implicates due 
process but does not require a pre-termination hearing.255 In determining 
the amount of process due, the Court set forth three factors to be weighed: 
(1) the private interests affected; (2) the procedural safeguards provided, 
specifically considering the risk of erroneous deprivation resulting from 
the procedures and the probable value of additional safeguards; and 
(3) the government’s interest.256 
Across jurisdictions, the entry of a protection order following 
alternative service occurs only when the respondent has been unable to be 
located for personal service.257 Thus, if a respondent actively seeks 
custody or visitation of a child, one would expect to be able to locate the 
respondent. Similarly, concern about a respondent being ordered to vacate 
his or her residence without receiving notice is also misplaced, as the 
petitioner would effectuate personal service on a respondent residing in a 
known residence who is not evading service. A respondent’s significant 
interest in having custody of his or her child, in remaining in the shared 
residence, or in not having a civil protection order issued against him or 
her is therefore unlikely to be infringed upon; even if it were however, 
this interest does not outweigh the value of the safeguards provided and 
the government’s interest. 
Multiple procedural safeguards minimize the risk of erroneous 
deprivation. First, orders are issued only upon a petitioner’s sworn and 
factually specific affidavit and/or testimony and only after a judicial 
officer determines that domestic abuse has occurred under the statutory 
definition.258 Before a judge can issue a TPO or Civil Protection Order, a 
judge must make statutory findings that the legal standards are satisfied.259 
Second, petitioners must generally make diligent efforts at personal 
service before alternative service is permitted, with actual notice being the 
                                                     
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
257. See supra Part II, detailing how personal service is required before alternative methods may 
be utilized in domestic violence cases. 
258. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 6200–6460 (West 2018) (requiring courts to find “an act or acts 
of abuse” before issuing a protective order); D.C. CODE § 16-1005(c) (2019) (requiring courts to find 
good cause to believe a respondent committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against the 
petitioner before entering relief). 
259. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1004(b)(1) (2019) (requiring courts to determine that the safety or welfare 
of the petitioner or petitioner’s household member are immediately endangered before issuing a TPO). 
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goal.260 Third, the respondent can make a motion to modify or vacate the 
order261; the “permanent” order is not truly permanent, as aggrieved 
respondents can petition the court to be heard and receive relief. Finally, 
courts must tailor the injunctive relief in civil protection orders to the 
case.262 
The federal government and each state have expressed strong interests 
in protecting survivors of domestic violence and in acting promptly to 
remedy the immediate and present dangers of such abuse. Indeed, the 
government “has an extraordinary interest in a society free from violence, 
especially where vulnerable persons are at risk.”263 States enacted 
domestic violence protection order laws to “prevent violence”264 and 
further their “strong policy against domestic violence.”265 Moreover, 
legislative history expresses the strong legislative intent that these 
protective laws be “broadly construed” to reduce violence.266 Courts have 
also noted the “vulnerability of the targeted population (largely 
unrepresented women and their minor children).”267 Given the safety 
issues at stake and the procedural safeguards the law affords, issuing a 
civil protection order following alternative service would sufficiently 
protect an alleged abusive partner’s right to due process. 
To safeguard both petitioners’ and respondents’ right to due process in 
the domestic violence realm, orders have been overturned when judges 
issued mutual protection orders without underlying allegations of 
abuse.268 During the 1990s and 2000s, many judges wrongfully issued 
protection orders against both the petitioner and respondent even though 
                                                     
260. Supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
261. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(11)(a) (2018) (“Upon application, notice to all parties, and hearing, 
the court may modify the terms of an existing order for protection.”); see also Mathews, 424 U.S. 319 
(discussing post-deprivation procedures to rectify an erroneous deprivation). 
262. See generally Stoever, supra note 45 (discussing the limited duration of civil protection orders). 
263. Baker v. Baker, 494 N.W.2d 282, 288 (Minn. 1992) (“[I]nasmuch as the statute requires an 
allegation of an ‘immediate and present danger of domestic abuse,’ there can be no argument that a special 
need for prompt action is shown.” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 518B.01(7)(a)) (internal citations omitted)). 
264. Holeman v. White, 292 P.3d 65, 68 (Okla. Civ. App. 2012) (“The Protection from Domestic 
Abuse Act serves a vital purpose, to prevent violence.”). 
265. Cesare v. Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 393 (N.J. 1998). 
266. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 734 (Ct. App. 2009) (identifying that “the 
Legislature intended that the DVPA [Domestic Violence Prevention Act] be broadly construed in 
order to accomplish the purpose of the DVPA” of reducing domestic violence). 
267. Id. at 735 (citing Gonzalez v. Munoz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 324 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
268. Isidora M. v. Silvino M., 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 502 (Ct. App. 2015) (reversing the issuance of a 
mutual civil protection order when only one party had sought an order against the other and allegations 
had not been filed to provide notice). 
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no allegations of abuse had been filed and the judges had not made 
findings of abuse committed by the petitioner.269 The judges reasoned that 
by prohibiting contact by either party, the parties would fully separate and 
the judicial orders would more effectively prevent future contact and 
violence. Without notice of allegations and findings of facts amounting to 
abuse under the domestic violence statutes, much less any claim of 
domestic violence, such orders violated due process. These appellate 
cases demonstrate that findings of facts and substantiated claims of abuse 
are necessary for protection orders to stand, relieving concern that 
frivolous or deceitful protection orders would exist if service were less of 
a barrier. 
2. Enforcement and Procedural Justice 
Regarding enforcement, personal service more readily guarantees 
enforcement of a domestic violence order because it ensures that the 
respondent has actual notice of the allegations and court proceeding and 
has been given the opportunity to appear in court to be heard. Naturally, 
orders are more easily enforced when notice is not of concern; without 
actual knowledge of protection order provisions, respondents can 
collaterally attack alleged violations on grounds that they did not know 
that their conduct was prohibited by the order. 
However, petitioners would often be able to prove actual notice through 
evidence other than proof of personal service, such as text messages, 
social media postings, or voicemails from the respondent that reference 
the protection order. Furthermore, enabling courts to issue protection 
orders that can later be personally served when the respondent reappears 
is preferable to leaving an abuse survivor without protection. Even if the 
respondent is not actually aware of the order, schools, workplaces, and 
others can still enforce protection orders to prevent violence and child 
abduction. 
From a procedural justice perspective, ensuring actual notice is 
preferable so that the respondent may present his or her case in court and 
feel heard, which increases compliance with court orders.270 Scholars have 
also noted that “[m]aking an abuser face a judge reinforces the idea that 
                                                     
269. Kit Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 218 (1992). 
270. Deborah Epstein, Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1843, 1868–69, 1876–79 & nn.113–17 (2002). 
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domestic abuse is unacceptable.”271 Furthermore, “[i]f early and critical 
opportunities to deter and inform alleged abusers are not utilized, a 
batterer will be more likely to consider the protection order against him a 
worthless piece of paper or a violation of his right to due process.”272 
Rather than defaulting to the broader state civil procedure codes, civil 
protection order remedies often have more stringent procedural rules 
imposed through family code provisions273 or procedural rules governing 
domestic violence courts.274 But in the domestic violence context, given 
the adequacy of alternative methods of service, the survivor’s need for 
safety-related legal protection, and the respondent’s ability to petition the 
court to vacate a protection order, alternative service protects due process 
of both parties. 
IV. EXPLAINING DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE 
Denial of legal protection for failure to achieve service contravenes the 
protective intent of domestic violence legislation, courts’ recognition of 
the “vulnerability of the targeted population (largely unrepresented 
women and their minor children),”275 and the readily obtainable option of 
alternative service in other areas of law. Part IV seeks to understand why 
jurisdictions impose heightened service requirements for domestic 
violence remedies. Section IV.A describes how procedural rules replicate 
and reinforce the state’s historic refusal to respond to domestic violence. 
Section IV.B reveals how subordination and experiences of violence are 
linked by race, class, and gender; amasses research showing that most 
abuse survivors seeking court protection are low-income women and are 
disproportionately women of color; and interrogates how the law works 
to erect barriers to their protection. Section IV.C explores societal 
reluctance to believe abuse survivors, which also results in barriers to 
accessing legal protection. 
                                                     
271. Schouvieller, supra note 175, at 609–10. Minnesota’s weighing between interests to focus on 
protecting abuse survivors is significant because the state ultimately created a one-step, self-finalizing 
ex parte protection order. Id. This does not exist in other states. 
272. Id. at 610. 
273. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018). 
274. See, e.g., D.C. SUPER. CT. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(a)(3). 
275. In re Marriage of Nadkarni, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 735 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing Gonzalez v. 
Munoz, 67 Cal. Rptr. 3d 317, 324 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
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A. Historic Acceptance of Domestic Violence 
The historical acceptance of spousal abuse and the context in which 
domestic violence laws evolved inform the current differential treatment 
of civil protection orders. Laws in the United States historically excluded 
marital relations from state oversight and intervention, with the family 
deemed a protected “private sphere”276 that was exempt from legal 
scrutiny, even when victimized individuals sought help.277 
At common law, a husband had the “right of chastisement” over his 
wife278 and the duty to “make the wife behave herself” through any means 
necessary, including through thrashing her.279 He could not be subject to 
prosecution unless he inflicted permanent damage on his wife.280 A wife’s 
identity was subsumed in her husband’s, thus preventing her from suing 
him.281 Marriage was considered sacred and permanent, regardless of the 
violence one spouse inflicted upon the other, with courts applying theories 
of family privacy to shield abusive spouses from prosecution.282 For 
                                                     
276. Morgan L. Woolley, Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic Violence and Non-Marital 
Rape Issues, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 269, 272, 275 (2007) (“The problem is that law enforcement 
and the courts withhold protection when it is most critically needed out of respect for family 
privacy.”); see State v. Edens, 95 N.C. 693 (1886) (deeming the family private and exempt from legal 
scrutiny); State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453, 455 (1868) (holding that the law recognizes family 
government as complete in itself, and will not “invade the domestic forum, or go behind the curtain” 
in the absence of permanent injury). 
277. See Edens, 95 N.C. at 697 (“We are not disposed . . . to break in needlessly upon that oneness 
of husband and wife, which is the fundamental and cherished maxim of the common law . . . .”). 
278. Blackstone stated that the husband has the right to restrain the wife “by domestic chastisement, 
in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentice or children.” 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *444. 
279. State v. Black, 60 N.C. 267 (1864) (holding that “[a] husband is responsible for the acts of his 
wife” thus permitting the husband to thrash her, if necessary to that end). 
280. See Edens, 95 N.C. at 695–96 (holding that a man could “assault and batter[]” his wife if he 
inflicted no permanent injury upon her, and also that a husband could “wanton[ly] and malicious[ly]” 
slander the good name of his wife with impunity); Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 455–56 (holding that the law 
recognizes family government “as complete in itself,” and will not “invade the domestic forum, or go 
behind the curtain” in the absence of permanent injury); State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. 123, 126 (1852) 
(finding that a wife is not a competent witness against her husband to prove battery that does not 
inflict permanent damage); Siegel, supra note 45, at 2118 (“The Anglo-American common law 
originally provided that a husband, as master of his household, could subject his wife to corporal 
punishment or ‘chastisement’ so long as he did not inflict permanent injury upon her.” (citation 
omitted)). 
281. See, e.g., Edens, 95 N.C. at 697 (noting that a woman cannot maintain an action against her 
husband due to her legal status upon marriage and describing the oneness of husband and wife as the 
“fundamental and cherished maxim of the common law”). 
282. Id. (noting that the law regards marriage as permanent and sacred and “leaves temporary 
differences and wrongs which one may do to the other to the corrective hands of time and reflection”). 
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example, in the 1868 case of State v. Rhodes,283 the North Carolina 
Supreme Court refused to prosecute a husband for repeatedly whipping 
his wife, stating, “[w]e will not inflict upon society the greater evil of 
raising the curtain upon domestic privacy, to punish the lesser evil of 
trifling violence.”284 Even after women were legally permitted to sue in 
their own names, the law granted interspousal immunity from tort claims 
to preserve the “tranquility of family relations.”285 
Professor Reva Siegel coined the phrase “preservation through 
transformation” to refer to legal change that gives the appearance of 
correcting a wrong while, in fact, perpetuating the status quo.286 The term 
aptly applies to domestic violence. After the law formally changed to 
repudiate domestic assault, courts granted immunity from prosecution to 
avoid disrupting family harmony and to protect the private sanctuary of 
the home.287 Likewise, the law traditionally provided immunity from 
marital rape charges and still provides differential protection and 
application.288 Violent crimes committed by strangers garner significantly 
more resources and attention than crimes committed against intimates,289 
and stranger violence is more likely to lead to arrests and convictions than 
identical crimes perpetrated against intimate partners or family 
members.290 
                                                     
283. 61 N.C. 453 (1868). 
284. Rhodes, 61 N.C. at 458–59 (observing that prosecution in middle-class families would be 
“harassing to them, or injurious to society,” and that judicial reach into upper-class households would 
bring “disgrace” and “ruin”). 
285. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 617–18 (1910) (considering the District of 
Columbia’s Married Women’s Property Act, invoking marital privacy rationale for interspousal tort 
immunity, and noting that such suits would “open the doors of the courts to accusations of all sorts of 
one spouse against the other, and bring into public notice complaints for assault, slander and libel”); 
Perkins v. Perkins, 62 Barb. 531, 535 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1872) (finding that allowing a cause of action 
between spouses would “overwhelm” the courts and allow “the parties to a marriage contract to sue 
each other for every fireside controversy”). 
286. Siegel, supra note 45, at 2119, 2166, 2169–70. 
287. Id. at 2120 (noting that immunities were granted by economic status to the benefit of middle- 
and upper-class men). 
288. Lisa R. Eskow, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and 
Reconceptualizing Its Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REV. 677, 682 (1996) (noting that at least thirteen 
states continue to “offer preferential or disparate treatment to perpetrators of spousal sexual assault”); 
Jaye Sitton, Old Wine in New Bottles: The “Marital” Rape Allowance, 72 N.C. L. REV. 261, 277 
(1993) (“The marital rape exemption went largely unchallenged from the time of Matthew Hale until 
the late 1970s.”). 
289. Carissa Hessick, Violence Between Lovers, Strangers, and Friends, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 343, 
344–45 (2007). 
290. Id. at 345–46, 352–53. 
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B. Preservation Through Transformation 
In the early 1900s, as laws and legal systems developed, states created 
family and juvenile courts to address criminal acts committed against 
spouses and children outside of criminal courts.291 These family courts 
prioritized family unity, encouraged reconciliation, and kept family 
violence private, even when victimized individuals sought criminal 
recourse.292 Law enforcement manuals instructed officers to delay 
responding to domestic violence calls, have the abuse perpetrator walk 
around the block, and otherwise mediate situations.293 Arrest and 
prosecution for domestic violence remained exceedingly rare.294 As the 
legal treatment of domestic violence shifted from marital duty and 
prerogative to marital privacy, change was merely in structure and 
rationale, and domestic violence largely remained socially and legally 
condoned.295 
Before the 1970s, the only civil remedy available for domestic violence 
was a protection order issued through a divorce.296 Prior to the no-fault 
divorce revolution that began in the 1970s, divorce required fault-based 
grounds, fees, and extensive proceedings necessitating attorneys.297 
Emergency ex parte orders in divorce required proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and violations were only penalized as civil contempt, which 
                                                     
291. ELIZABETH PLECK, DOMESTIC TYRANNY: THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY AGAINST FAMILY 
VIOLENCE FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 126 (1987). 
292. Id. at 137–38. See Camille Carey, Correcting Myopia in Domestic Violence Advocacy: 
Moving Forward in Lawyering and Law School Clinics, 21 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 220, 226–27 
(2011) (identifying how early family courts prevented domestic abuse from being recognized as a 
public issue); Siegel, supra note 45, at 2118 (describing the treatment of wife battering in the Anglo-
American common law). 
293. Lisa Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for Policy and 
Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 480 (2005) [hereinafter 
Goodman & Epstein, Refocusing on Women]. 
294. See Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999) (regarding an equal 
protection claim against the sheriff and county under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the county had a 
policy or custom that discriminated against domestic violence victims by giving lower priority to their 
9-1-1 calls than to 9-1-1 non-domestic violence calls); Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. 
Conn. 1984) (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause was violated by a 
police department that routinely provided less protection to domestic violence victims than to victims 
of stranger violence).   
295. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 2169–70 (“The regulation of marital violence was thus translated 
into the language of companionate marriage prevailing during the industrial era.”). 
296. See Tarr, supra note 122, at 161 (“In order to get an injunction [preventing domestic violence], 
the woman had to bring a lawsuit, which, in most cases, meant a divorce proceeding.”). 
297. See Laurence M. Friedman, Divorce: The “Silent Revolution”, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION 203 
(15th ed., Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 2009). 
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generally meant a verbal reprimand.298 Permitting protection orders only 
via divorce proved to be sorely inadequate given the lengthy nature of 
divorce proceedings, the assumption that married petitioners wished to 
divorce, the exclusion of unmarried victims from court protection, and the 
lack of enforcement. A new legal remedy was needed. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, battered-women’s activists and scholars 
sought to transform domestic violence from a private matter into a public 
one by creating legal mechanisms to enhance abuse survivors’ safety and 
independence.299 The first domestic violence protection order legislation 
was passed in 1970,300 with advocates intending for this autonomy-
enhancing injunctive relief to “radically alter the balance of power 
between abusers and their victims”301 and enable survivors to invoke 
protections of the criminal justice system.302 By 1993, all fifty states and 
the District of Columbia had enacted protection order statutes.303 
As with many legal issues related to family formation and dissolution, 
state law largely governs protection orders and thus varies by state.304 As 
states enacted domestic violence protection order statutes to protect 
domestic violence survivors and their children from further danger, each 
state determined how to define domestic violence and the types of 
relationships covered, relief available, duration of orders, and rules 
governing domestic violence remedies.305 
In light of the deeply entrenched societal and legal acceptance of 
domestic violence, protection order laws provided significant remedies 
that were previously unavailable. Heightened standards for domestic 
                                                     
298. Tarr, supra note 122, at 161. 
299. Goodman & Epstein, Refocusing on Women, supra note 293, at 480. 
300. Tamara L. Kuennen, “No-Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial 
Intervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 48 (2007). 
301. David M. Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and Their Impact on 
Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1451 (2010); see also Barbara J. Hart, State Codes on Domestic 
Violence: Analysis, Commentary and Recommendations, 43 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 3, 23 (1992). 
302. See Tarr, supra note 122, at 159. 
303. LISA A. GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN 33 (2008). 
304. The U.S. Supreme Court has frequently proclaimed that family law is a matter of state law. 
See, e.g., Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“[T]he whole subject of domestic relations of 
husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the State, and not to the laws of the United 
States.”). But see 18 U.S.C. § 228 (2018) (federal law regarding failure to pay child support 
obligations); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (legalizing same-sex 
marriage across the United States); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down all state laws 
banning interracial marriage). 
305. Each state has its own statutorily based civil and criminal remedies for domestic violence. For 
forms of relief, see supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text. 
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violence relief, however, prevent survivors from accessing such relief and 
preserve existing gender hierarchies.306 As another example of differential 
protection concerning domestic violence, short-term statutory injunctions 
against domestic violence problematically give the appearance of 
ostensibly remedying domestic abuse, but only temporarily address the 
often-ongoing danger. Although injunctions regarding trademarks, 
business matters, and financial interests are often permanent, civil 
protection orders, which are a form of injunctive relief, are most 
commonly only one year in duration.307 
By imposing more stringent service requirements, the procedural 
barriers to accessing legal protection shape and perpetuate intimate 
partner violence, in contrast to the ready access that litigants in other areas 
of the law have to the courts and legal remedies. Despite progress in the 
creation of laws against violence, the legal system continues to perpetuate 
status differences by giving diminished protection to domestic violence 
survivors, most of whom are female. 
C. Race, Class, and Gender Identities of Domestic Violence 
Petitioners 
Aspects of identity are relevant to understanding the persistent 
differential treatment of domestic violence remedies, including 
heightened procedural requirements. Most petitioners in domestic 
violence court are low-income women, with high percentages of 
petitioners identifying as women of color,308 and states’ procedural rules 
hold these litigants to rigid requirements that impede access to protection. 
The heightened procedural requirements for protection from domestic 
violence thus impose racial, gender, and class-based disadvantages on 
communities the law has historically oppressed. 
                                                     
306. See Siegel, supra note 45, at 2119 (noting that the legal system plays an important role in 
perpetuating status differences between husbands and wives). 
307. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse, supra note 45, at 1015. 
308. See Tricia B. Bent-Goodley, Culture and Domestic Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 
195, 196 (2005) (discussing the differential impact of domestic violence within groups of color); Lisa 
Langenderfer-Magruder et al., Experiences of Intimate Partner Violence and Subsequent Police 
Reporting Among Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Adults in Colorado, 31 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 855 (2016) (noting that LGBTQ individuals are at equal or higher risk of 
intimate partner violence victimization as compared to heterosexual individuals, and transgender 
individuals experience significantly higher rates of abuse than their cisgender peers); Beth Richie, A 
Black Feminist Reflection on the Antiviolence Movement, 25 SIGNS 1133, 1136 (2000) (noting that 
poor women of color are “most likely to be in both dangerous intimate relationships and dangerous 
social positions”); Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Domestic Violence at the Intersections of Race, 
Class, and Gender, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38 (2005) (discussing the need to give voice to 
battered women from diverse backgrounds while focusing on remedying structural inequalities). 
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Most protection order petitioners are women seeking protection from 
abusive male partners, with demographic data from multiple jurisdictions 
revealing that women are petitioners in approximately 85% to 92% of 
civil protection order cases.309 These rates are consistent with significant 
research showing that approximately 85% of domestic violence survivors 
identify as female and 90% of abuse perpetrators identify as male.310 
Research further shows that abuse endured by women is typically more 
severe than abuse men experience,311 and that petitioners seek court 
protection only after lengthy histories of abuse.312 Domestic violence is 
understood to be about power and control dynamics and coercive control, 
not solely gender, and experiences of abuse perpetuated by women against 
men should not be discounted.313 Additionally, although lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) individuals experience 
intimate partner violence at the same or higher rates than individuals in 
heterosexual relationships, legal protection and community-based 
                                                     
309. See Alesha Durfee, Victim Narratives, Legal Representation, and Domestic Violence Civil 
Protection Orders, 4 FEMINIST CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (2009) (finding that 85% of petitioners are female 
in a random sample of protection order petitions in an urban county); Susan B. Sorenson & Haikang 
Shen, Restraining Orders in California: A Look at Statewide Data, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
912, 920 (2005) (examining over 200,000 domestic violence civil restraining order cases in California, 
and finding that a man was to be restrained in 83.6% of cases); Katherine A. Vittes & Susan B. 
Sorenson, Are Temporary Restraining Orders More Likely to Be Issued When Applications Mention 
Firearms?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 266, 271 (2006) (analyzing Los Angeles County filings and finding 
that 92.2% of petitioners were female, while 7.8% of petitioners were male). 
310. Studies by the Department of Justice and the American Medical Association have shown that 
80% of abuse is male to female, 10% is male to male, 6% is female to female, and 4% is female to 
male. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. ET AL., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2003) [hereinafter COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER 
VIOLENCE]; see also TJADEN & THOENNES, supra note 67, at 5 (discussing rates at which women are 
abused). 
311. See Lois Schwaeber, Recognizing Domestic Violence: How to Know It When You See It and 
How to Provide Appropriate Representation, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, ABUSE, AND CHILD CUSTODY: 
LEGAL STRATEGIES AND POLICY ISSUES 2–12 (Mo T. Hannah & Barry Goldstein eds., 2010) 
(identifying that women experience higher levels of violence in intimate relationships in comparison 
to men, including serious physical assault or being choked, drowned, or threatened with a gun); COSTS 
OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE, supra note 310, at 14 (discussing rates of physical violence). 
312. Jane K. Stoever, Transforming Domestic Violence Representation, 101 KY. L.J. 483, 522 
(2013) (describing the process abuse survivors undertake when seeking to leave an abusive 
relationship or to end the violence in an ongoing relationship). 
313. See Jamie R. Abrams, The Feminist Case for Acknowledging Women’s Acts of Violence, 27 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101 (2016). 
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services have typically had a hetero-normative approach and have not 
been accessible to LGBTQ abuse survivors.314 
Domestic violence petitioners are more commonly women of color 
than represented in a region’s population. For example, in the District of 
Columbia, over 85% of petitioners and respondents in civil protection 
order cases in 2012 were African American, while 50% of the population 
is African American.315 As an additional example, in a recent review of 
Los Angeles County cases, 72% of petitioners identified as Latino, 20% 
as African American, 4.5% as Caucasian, and 3.7% as Asian/Pacific 
Islander; compared with the county’s ethnic composition, Latinos and 
African Americans were significantly overrepresented as petitioners in 
domestic violence cases.316 Other aspects of identity or health status can 
further compound challenges to receiving court-ordered protection. For 
example, women who are HIV-positive or at risk for HIV “face a fifty 
percent chance of being a victim of domestic violence,”317 and individuals 
experiencing domestic violence are at increased risk for HIV exposure. 318 
Demographic statistics are striking in the context of historic lack of 
outreach to and accessibility of services to racially and ethnically diverse 
populations.319 Additional studies of protection order petitioners confirm 
these demographic patterns over time,320 although these trends are shifting 
                                                     
314. See, e.g., Victoria Cruz, Domestic Violence Advocate/Counselor, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender Communities and Intimate Partner Violence, Panel Discussion, in 29 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 121, 147 (2001) (describing the inability of many gay, lesbian, and transgender victims to access 
domestic violence shelters). 
315. SURVIVORS & ADVOCATES FOR EMPOWERMENT (DC SAFE), INC., supra note 17, at 7. 
316. Vittes & Sorenson, supra note 309, at 271. 
317. D.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, JUSTICE FOR ALL? AN EXAMINATION OF THE CIVIL LEGAL 
NEEDS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S LOW-INCOME COMMUNITY 61 (2008), 
http://www.dcaccesstojustice.org/files/CivilLegalNeedsReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TM33-NZG8]; 
D.C METRO. POLICE DEP’T, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND HIV, https://mpdc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
dc/sites/mpdc/publication/attachments/DV_HIV.pdf [https://perma.cc/75UL-UZUD]. 
318. D.C. METRO. POLICE DEP’T, supra note 317. 
319. Sherry Lipsky et al., The Role of Intimate Partner Violence, Race, and Ethnicity in Help-
Seeking Behaviors, 11 J. ETHNICITY & HEALTH 81 (2006); Lisa M. Martinson, An Analysis of 
Racism and Resources for African-American Female Victims of Domestic Violence in Wisconsin, 16 
WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 259, 269–70 (2001) (describing exclusionary and discriminatory practices in 
domestic violence shelters and services). 
320. See OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE FOR JUSTICE INITIATIVES, SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGANTS: CHARACTERISTICS, NEEDS, SERVICES (2005), https://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/delivery_legal_services/downloads/nyselfrepresentedlitigants.a
uthcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5Q6-A8XR] (surveying over 3,300 self-represented litigants in 
New York City Family Court and New York City Housing Court in 2003, and finding that 83% of 
unrepresented litigants in these courts identified as African American, Asian, or Latino, with the 
proportions of African American and Latino pro se litigants far outstripping their representation in 
the general population); Sorenson & Shen, supra note 309, at 914, 922. 
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during the Trump era.321 Following President Trump’s election and 
expanded immigration enforcement efforts, dramatically fewer abuse 
survivors with unsecure immigration status are seeking help from 
domestic violence agencies or the civil or criminal justice systems.322 
Axes of identity and oppression intersect, as poor Americans are 
disproportionately women of color,323 and increased poverty correlates 
with greater levels of domestic violence.324 Protection order petitioners 
generally have scarce financial resources and struggle financially while 
seeking protection from abuse.325 Nationwide, domestic violence is the 
leading cause of homelessness for women and children,326 and over half 
of women who attempt to leave abusive relationships fall below the 
poverty line.327 Recent studies found that protection order petitioners in 
Kentucky328 and battered immigrants329 generally have incomes of less 
than $15,000. Poverty limits options, creates stressors and conditions that 
promote abuse, and makes it more difficult to escape abuse. 
Unsurprisingly, most domestic violence petitioners are unable to afford 
counsel as they navigate the court system seeking protection. 
Studies across areas of the law show that petitioners in domestic 
violence protection order cases are the least likely to be represented by 
                                                     
321. James Queally, Fearing Deportation, Many Domestic Violence Victims Are Steering Clear of 
Police and Courts, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-
undocumented-crime-reporting-20171009-story.html [https://perma.cc/AUQ9-4J2G].  
322. Id. 
323. JOHN ICELAND, POVERTY IN AMERICA 81, 88 (2d ed. 2006). 
324. Jody Raphael, Battering Through the Lens of Class, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
367, 367 (2003) (citing studies that document that household income predicts the level of violence in 
a home); SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 16 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipvus.pdf [https://perma.cc/V2MK-
HNAN] (examining nonfatal intimate partner victimization and finding that “females living in 
households with lower annual incomes experienced the highest average annual rates”). 
325. See Donna Coker, Shifting Power for Battered Women: Law, Material Resources, and Poor 
Women of Color, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1009, 1019 (1999). 
326. Sokoloff & Dupont, supra note 308, at 44. 
327. Leslye Orloff, Lifesaving Welfare Safety Net Access for Battered Immigrant Women and 
Children: Accomplishments and Next Steps, 7 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 597, 617–18 (2001).  
328. Lisa Shannon et al., Intimate Partner Violence, Relationship Status, and Protective Orders: 
Does “Living in Sin” Entail a Different Experience?, 22 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 1114, 1119 
(2007) (58% of study participants had annual incomes of less than $15,000). 
329. Nawal H. Ammar et al., Battered Immigrant Women in the United States and Protection 
Orders: An Exploratory Research, 37 CRIM. JUST. REV. 337, 338 (2012) (finding that 67% of battered 
immigrant women have yearly incomes of less than $15,000). 
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counsel.330 For example, a recent study of the District of Columbia courts 
found that approximately 98% of both petitioners and respondents in the 
Domestic Violence Unit proceed pro se.331 Pro se litigation in complex 
civil litigation, such as tort claims and commercial disputes, is extremely 
rare, as is pro se litigant involvement in property rights claims.332 Data 
from Washington State reveal pro se litigation in only 2-3% of complex 
civil cases and in 19-20% of property rights cases.333 In stark contrast, 
litigants are self-represented in 95% of domestic violence cases in 
Washington State.334 
Access-to-justice scholars have examined the correlation between 
poverty and self-representation as they study court systems.335 Pro se 
litigants typically report that they cannot afford an attorney, do not consult 
with an attorney, have limited formal education, and are at a disadvantage 
in pursuing legal claims.336 They often struggle to understand procedural 
rules, become frustrated with the seeming impossibility of the legal 
system, or are overwhelmed by the economic, logistical, and social toll of 
cases.337 Much scholarship has focused on how pro se litigants are 
disadvantaged in courtroom situations, how self-representation barriers 
diminish pro se litigants’ confidence in the judicial system, what the 
challenges are to judicial officers, and what additional resources courts 
and litigants need.338 
The experience of domestic violence amplifies the significant 
challenges inherent in self-representation. Abuse survivors struggle with 
the physical and psychological effects of violence and the trauma 
provoked by coming to court, anticipating that they will recount histories 
                                                     
330. Anne D. Janku & Joseph A. Vradenburg, Self-Represented Litigants and Civil Case 
Dispositions in Missouri: An Impact Analysis, 51 CT. REV. 74, 76 (2015); see also Steinberg, supra 
note 38, at 749–51 (discussing increasing rates of pro se litigants in domestic violence cases). 
331. D.C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE COMM’N, supra note 317, at 83. 
332. JUDICIAL SERVS. DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, AN ANALYSIS OF PRO SE LITIGANTS 
IN WASHINGTON STATE 1995–2000, at 2 (2001), https://www.courts.wa.gov/sub 
site/wsccr/docs/Final%20Report_Pro_Se_11_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/649Q-P6YR].  
333. Id. (examining Judicial Information System data and finding pro se litigant involvement in 
20% of property rights issues in Washington State from 1995 to 2000). 
334. Id. at 3 tbl.1. 
335. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1788–90 (2001); 
Steinberg, supra note 38, at 752–54. 
336. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF ADMIN. JUDGE, supra note 320 (surveying over 3,300 self-
represented litigants in New York City Family Court and New York City Housing Court in 2003). 
337. Id.; see generally CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINS., POSITION PAPER ON SELF-
REPRESENTED LITIGATION (2000), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/de 
livery_legal_services/downloads/positionpaper.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/4C6R-TG2W]. 
338. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADMINS., supra note 337, at 1–4. 
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of abuse and possibly encounter and be cross-examined by the abusive 
partner.339 Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as those who are 
represented by counsel, yet they commonly have difficulty properly 
serving the opposing party and lack the resources and ability to do so.340 
Not only do the procedural rules presume counsel who serves a vital role 
in achieving service of process,341 they ignore domestic violence 
dynamics and barriers to personally serving an abusive partner. 
Petitioners who are unable to personally serve respondents struggle to 
decide whether they can repeatedly return to court to seek continuances, 
which often entails missing work, foregoing income, and having to make 
daycare and transportation arrangements, in addition to being emotionally 
taxing. Even with states increasingly enacting laws that prohibit 
employers from firing domestic violence petitioners for missing work due 
to court hearings,342 revealing personal information to utilize such laws 
and losing wages present real hardships. 
Access to safety and questions of procedural justice should be 
evaluated in the context of the historic lack of protection against domestic 
violence, the state’s historic oppression of women, and the racialized, 
gendered, and class-based implications of imposing heightened notice 
requirements. An interrelated part of the state’s differential legal treatment 
of domestic violence survivors is its common distrust and disbelief of 
abuse allegations, as explored in the next Section. 
D. Distrust of Domestic Violence Claims and Claimants 
Jurisdictions enacted heightened procedural requirements for domestic 
violence remedies in the context of historic “judicial and societal distrust 
                                                     
339. Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 101 (2005). 
340. DONNA STIENSTRA ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., ASSISTANCE TO PRO SE LITIGANTS IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS: A REPORT ON SURVEYS OF CLERKS OF COURT AND CHIEF JUDGES 21–23 (2011), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/ProSeUSDC.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q32T-N3WV]; Dan 
Gustafson et al., Pro Se Litigation and the Costs of Access to Justice, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
32, 37 (2012). 
341. Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 275 (Ct. App. 1993) (identifying counsel as being of 
“central importance” to achieving service of process). 
342. See Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State 
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 700 (2008); see, 
e.g., Cal. Labor Code § 230(c) (2019) (prohibiting employers from discharging or discriminating or 
retaliating against employees who take time off from work to seek domestic violence legal remedies 
and to attend court hearings). 
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of female complainants,”343 which persists to this day.344 Research shows 
that fact finders disbelieve women solely because of their gender, 
typically viewing women to be less credible than men and prone to 
exaggerate claims, especially as related to gender-based violence and their 
children.345 Professors Deborah Epstein and Lisa Goodman write about 
how female abuse survivors routinely “face a Gaslight-style gauntlet of 
doubt, disbelief, and outright dismissal of their stories.”346 A recent study 
of gender stereotypes and credibility determinations found that both male 
and female study participants viewed masculine victims as more credible 
than feminine victims in scenarios with male defendants.347 Current 
empirical research of custody cases involving allegations of domestic 
violence and alienation348 also statistically confirms gender bias. 
Professor Joan Meier and Sean Dickson conclude, “Overall, fathers who 
were accused of abuse and who accused the mother of alienation won their 
cases 72% of the time; slightly more than when they were not accused of 
abuse (67%).”349 Furthermore, “When mothers alleged domestic violence, 
                                                     
343. Francine Banner, Honest Victim Scripting in the Twitterverse, 22 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & 
L. 495, 543 (2016); cf. Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 828 (2007) 
(discussing reasons that many abuse victims distrust law enforcement and judges). 
344. The nation was divided over Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s allegations that now-Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh sexually assaulted her, with some critiquing her for not coming forward sooner. See Lisa 
Bonos, Trump Asks Why Christine Blasey Ford Didn’t Report Her Allegation Sooner. Survivors Answer 
with #WhyIDidntReport, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/soloish/wp/2018/09/21/trump-asks-why-christine-blasey-ford-
didnt-report-her-allegation-sooner-survivors-answer-withwhyididntreport/?utm_term=.7b785e3ccda8 
[https://perma.cc/4VP3-DXAH]; Monica Rhor, Brett Kavanaugh Supreme Court Confirmation Hearing 
Shows Divide Between Men, Women, USA TODAY (Sept. 29, 2018, 2:35 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/09/28/brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford-assault-
claim-gender-divide/1459557002/ [https://perma.cc/4DAQ-KAPX]. 
345.  WELLESLEY CTRS. FOR WOMEN, BATTERED MOTHERS SPEAK OUT: A HUMAN RIGHTS 
REPORT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND CHILD CUSTODY IN THE MASSACHUSETTS FAMILY COURTS 3 
(2002) (reporting that fathers who seek custody are favored over mothers because “mothers are held 
to a different and higher standard than fathers”); Dana H. Conner, Abuse and Discretion: Evaluating 
Judicial Discretion in Custody Cases Involving Violence Against Women, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 163, 176, 178 (2009). 
346. Epstein & Goodman, Discounting Credibility, supra note 52. 
347. Nesa E. Wasarhaley et al., The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on Legal Perceptions of Lesbian 
Intimate Partner Violence, 32 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 635 (2017). 
348. Parental alienation is a construct created by Richard Gardner, a child psychiatrist, “to describe 
a ‘syndrome’ whereby vengeful mothers employed child abuse allegations in litigation as a powerful 
weapon to punish ex-husbands and ensure custody to themselves.” Joan S. Meier & Sean Dickson, 
Mapping Gender: Shedding Empirical Light on Family Courts’ Treatment of Cases Involving Abuse 
and Alienation, 35 LAW & INEQ. 311, 316 (2017). The concept lacks “any scientific or empirical 
foundation, and has today been largely—although by no means completely—rejected by experts and 
scholars, and to a lesser degree, courts.” Id. at 317. 
349. Id. at 328. 
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fathers won 73% of the time . . . . Child sexual abuse allegations 
increased fathers’ likelihood of winning to 81%.”350 This contemporary 
research echoes the conclusions of multiple states’ Gender Bias Task 
Forces: “Women receive unfavorable substantive outcomes in cases 
because of their gender, and men do not. Women’s complaints are 
trivialized and their circumstances misconstrued more often than men’s, 
and women more often than men are victims of demeaning and openly 
hostile behavior in court proceedings.”351 
Domestic violence is trivialized by “all reaches of the justice system, 
from police through prosecutors and judges,”352 and a woman’s character 
is often attacked when she makes a complaint of abuse or sexual assault.353 
Scholars and judicial-watch groups have tracked judicial hostility to 
domestic violence remedies. Professor James Ptacek details judicial 
responses that reinforce women’s entrapment in abusive relationships, 
including minimizing, denying, and blaming the petitioner; neglecting the 
survivor’s fears; exhibiting patronizing displays of authority, bias against 
victim/survivors, and racist attitudes toward women of color; and making 
hostile remarks toward domestic violence petitioners.354 An example of 
judges enabling violent respondents includes being unwilling to impose 
sanctions on respondents.355 
                                                     
350. Id. (emphasis in original). 
351. Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of State Task 
Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 55 (1996). A 2015 survey which yielded over 900 
responses reported similar findings about police hostility, blame, and disbelief of abuse victims. 
ACLU, CUNY SCHOOL OF LAW & UNIV. OF MIAMI SCHOOL OF LAW, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: 
SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND POLICING 12 (2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015.10.20_report_-_responses_from_the_ 
field.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DHA-LVX4]. 
352. Swent, supra note 351, at 55. 
353. Banner, supra note 343, at 495 (describing how on social media sites, “terms such as ‘gold 
digger,’ ‘slut,’ and ‘ho’ are engaged with regularity to describe those who come forward alleging an 
assault by a public figure”); Karen Czapanskiy, Domestic Violence, the Family, and the Lawyering 
Process: Lessons from Studies on Gender Bias in the Courts, 27 FAM. L. Q. 247, 254–55 n.19 (1993) 
(identifying that female rape and domestic violence victims must often defend themselves against 
accusations that they provoked the abusive act or are exaggerating the violence). 
354. JAMES PTACEK, BATTERED WOMEN IN THE COURTROOM: THE POWER OF JUDICIAL 
RESPONSES (1999), http://tcfv.org/pdf/Updated_wheels/Judical_responses%20that%20entrap.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B5BR-BET8] (depicting the Power and Control Wheel displaying judicial 
responses that reinforce women’s entrapment). 
355. Id. 
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Alongside the countless examples of judicial resistance or refusal to 
enforce domestic violence laws,356 the state engages in racialized, 
gendered, and class-based patterns of intervention in the family. This 
includes the child welfare system’s targeting of African American and 
Latino families with low incomes357 and heightened state scrutiny and 
distrust of low-income women of color in the public benefits context.358 
The state also often renders the rights of women irrelevant and their 
decision-making capacity suspect regarding their reproductive health.359 
In sum, race, class, gender, and victimization axes of identity make certain 
individuals particularly vulnerable to state intrusion and control while the 
state simultaneously fails to provide the help abuse survivors seek.360 
The recent #MeToo movement is relevant to societal and legal 
responses to gender-based violence. The movement reveals the persistent 
societal reluctance to believe abuse survivors and offer real remedies, 
seeks to create sustained social change, and draws on longstanding 
feminist practices while also displaying some of the same privileging, 
silencing, and infighting of the early battered women’s movement.361 The 
                                                     
356. Lynn H. Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (1995) 
(“The reports of state supreme court task forces on gender bias in the courts are replete with reports 
of judges who trivialize violence against women.” (citations omitted)). 
357. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Removing Violent Parents from the Home: A Test Case for the Public 
Health Approach, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 638, 658 (2005). 
358. Wendy Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and Support, 25 YALE J.L. 
& FEMINISM 317, 319–20 (2014); Khiara M. Bridges, Towards A Theory of State Visibility: Race, 
Poverty, and Equal Protection, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 965, 968 (2010) (identifying how the 
administration of public benefits and the information women must cede to the state is “premised on a 
profound distrust of poor people and poor mothers”); Priscilla A. Ocen, The New Racially Restrictive 
Covenant: Race, Welfare, and the Policing of Black Women in Subsidized Housing, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
1540 (2012). 
359. See Joanne E. Brosh & Monica K. Miller, Regulating Pregnancy Behaviors: How the 
Constitutional Rights of Minority Women Are Disproportionately Compromised, 16 AM. U. J. 
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 438–39 (2008); Ruth Colker, Blaming Mothers: A Disability 
Perspective, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2015) (identifying the state’s distrust of women’s decision-
making throughout pregnancy and motherhood); Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1657 (2008); Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and Punishment in the New Age of 
Reprogenetics, 54 EMORY L.J. 1343, 1346 (2005) (describing the “rush to punish poor, substance-
abusing mothers for their reproductive failures”); Ruthann Robson, Lesbians and Abortion, 35 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 247, 277 (2011) (identifying that “an interrogation of a woman’s ‘reason’ 
for having an abortion demonstrates a distrust of women similar to the distrust apparent in other 
abortion restrictions that treat women [who] have abortions quite differently than ungendered patients 
providing informed consent for other medical procedures”). 
360. See generally Stoever, Mirandizing Family Justice, supra note 119 (analyzing state services 
that replicate control and deny survivors autonomy); Stoever, Parental Abduction, supra note 65 
(identifying the state’s hyper-aggressive interventions in some contexts, often against victims’ wishes, 
while failing to criminally or civilly respond to other areas for which survivors seek help). 
361. See Jane K. Stoever, Introduction, in THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY (Jane K. Stoever ed., 
forthcoming 2019); Caroline Kitchener, Larry Nassar and the Impulse to Doubt Female Pain, 
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#MeToo movement and news reports initially focused on Hollywood, 
politicians, and those in the public eye, with multiple complaints against 
Harvey Weinstein, Matt Lauer, Charlie Rose, Al Franken, Kevin Spacey, 
Louis CK, Mario Batali, and dozens of other high-profile individuals.362 
It appeared that multiple women publicly had to allege abuse or 
harassment for any single survivor’s allegation to be believed, and all too 
often, workplaces, schools, churches, and other institutions of trust had 
longstanding knowledge of pernicious abuse, as was the case with 
Dr. Larry Nassar’s sexual abuse of over 100 girls and women.363 Similar 
to the limited focus on the plight of domestic violence litigants, the 
#MeToo movement initially lacked any focus on less glamorous 
workplaces and professions. In further developing domestic violence 
remedies and responses, this Article explores how overly onerous service 
of process requirements compound the challenges abuse survivors face in 
legal systems that have not been responsive to their complaints and how 
such rules create barriers to safety and justice, necessitating reform. 
V. LAW REFORM TO INCREASE ACCESS TO SAFETY AND 
JUSTICE 
Efforts to remedy gender-based violence must include making legal 
remedies accessible. Courts currently dismiss volumes of protection order 
cases daily for lack of personal service, leaving abuse survivors without 
needed protection. Jurisdictions should instead reform procedural rules to 
address historic injustices and provide actual access to domestic violence 
remedies. 
Due to the safety and logistical difficulties in accomplishing personal 
service in a significant volume of domestic violence cases, this Article 
recommends that all states adopt provisions automatically permitting 
alternative service after two hearing dates at which personal service is not 
achieved. This Article further recommends that court rules enable 
petitioners to request alternative means, such as electronic service, from 
                                                     
ATLANTIC (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2018/01/larry-nassar-and-the-
impulse-to-doubt-female-pain/551198/ [https://perma.cc/8LLT-KAHY]; supra notes 47–53 and 
accompanying text. 
362. Supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text. 
363. See Kitchener, supra note 361; Dan Barry et al., Molested as FBI Case Plodded for a Year, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/03/sports/nassar-fbi.html 
[https://perma.cc/W4BA-YHHQ] (reporting that at least forty girls and women were molested by 
Dr. Nassar after he was under federal investigation). 
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the outset upon filing domestic violence cases in situations in which the 
respondent’s home, employment address, and whereabouts are unknown. 
The challenges regarding service are so common that three states, 
Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington, have enacted an automatic means 
of permitting alternative service methods after initial attempts at personal 
service fail.364 Additional concrete reforms identified in Sections V.A and 
V.B are also essential in order to increase access to the protection order 
remedy. 
A. Abrogate Procedural Laws Preventing Access to Protection Orders 
Current rules requiring notice before seeking temporary protection 
from abuse, mandating case dismissal for failure to perfect personal 
service, and requiring that personal service be accomplished multiple days 
prior to the hearing date for it to be valid prevent access to safety and 
justice for abuse survivors. 
1. Address Pre-Temporary Protection Order Notice Rules 
Some jurisdictions require a domestic violence survivor to notify the 
abusive partner before the petitioner seeks a temporary emergency 
protection order. For example, eleven California counties require the 
petitioner to contact the respondent by phone or in person and provide 
notice four to twenty-four hours prior to filing for a temporary civil 
protection order.365 These rules are highly dangerous and contrary to the 
national standard, which permits courts to grant TPOs without notice if 
the respondent poses a present risk of abuse.366 
Given the heightened rates of abuse and lethal violence at separation, 
the risk of revealing confidential locations, and the short-term nature of 
TPOs which can be vacated, jurisdictions should abrogate laws that 
require that the petitioner give notice prior to seeking emergency 
temporary protection. 
2. Prevent Dismissal for Failure to Serve 
Some jurisdictions’ court rules require courts to dismiss cases when the 
petitioner has failed to personally serve the respondent by the first, 
                                                     
364. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2018); NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.030 (2018). 
365. California counties requiring pre-TPO notice include Alameda, Alpine, Amador, Butte, 
Humboldt, Imperial, Inyo, Kern, Lake, Lassen, and Los Angeles. See, e.g., ORANGE CTY. R. 704(1) 
(four-hour notice); SIERRA CTY. R. 6.14(a) (notice by 10:00 a.m. the prior day). 
366. See supra notes 142–145. 
12 - Stoever (2).docx (Do Not Delete) 4/4/2019  8:48 PM 
2019] ACCESS TO SAFETY AND JUSTICE 395 
 
second, or third hearing date.367 Many of these petitioners would be 
legally entitled to relief if they were able to have an evidentiary hearing 
on the merits, and rules mandating dismissal directly contravene the 
petitioner’s due process right to a hearing.368 Mandatory dismissal rules 
also leave abuse survivors without needed protection that can prevent 
respondents from coming to their homes, workplaces, and schools; 
prohibit respondents from taking their children from daycare or school; 
and provide additional safety-related protection. 
When states do not specify the number of times a petitioner may return 
to court if personal service is not effectuated,369 some judges as a matter 
of practice dismiss domestic violence petitions for lack of service after 
only one or two attempts, informing petitioners that the dismissal is 
“without prejudice” and they may re-file once the respondent reappears.370 
The routine dismissal of cases for lack of personal service fails to protect 
individuals being stalked or still abused, but whose intimate partners 
successfully evade service. Instead, service rules should be reformed to 
make service of process more effective,371 and should prevent the 
dismissal of cases before a hearing on the merits. 
Additionally, respondents may not have stable home or work addresses, 
yet may still be in contact through telephone, text message, and social 
media and know the petitioner’s whereabouts. The nationwide 
requirement that parties cannot serve process themselves and must instead 
do so through a third party to ensure validity of service372 presents further 
barriers to achieving service. Unfortunately, all too often the petitioner 
has the unique opportunity to serve the respondent when the respondent 
unexpectedly appears at the petitioner’s home. An exception to the 
general rule against a litigant personally serving the opposing party should 
be made for such situations. Personal service requirements are challenging 
                                                     
367. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
368. See supra Section III.A. 
369. Rebecca Griego Bill Passes Senate Unanimously, supra note 16 (“Currently, protection orders 
must be served on the abuser in person, and there are no clearly defined limits to how many times a 
victim must return to court if the authorities are not able to locate and serve the abuser.”). 
370. Minute Orders providing examples are on file with the Author. The Author has also heard this 
statement from multiple judges. 
371. See infra Section V.B. 
372. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 414.10 (West 2018) (“A summons may be served by any 
person who is at least 18 years of age and not a party to the action.”); TEX. R. CIV. P. 103 (“[N]o 
person who is a party to or interested in the outcome of a suit may serve any process in that suit.”). 
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for both petitioners and law enforcement,373 as reflected in the high rates 
of case continuances and dismissals for lack of service.374 
3. Nullify Time Limits 
Many states require that service occur a set number of days prior to the 
hearing, with five days being common across states.375 This means that a 
litigant could achieve personal service closer to the hearing, but the court 
would not consider the service valid, the merit hearing could not occur, 
and the respondent would be alerted to evade service. 
Any personal service should be considered effective, particularly 
considering the compressed timeframe of two to three weeks from the 
filing date to the hearing date. Instead of imposing a multi-day period prior 
to the hearing by which service must be effectuated, respondents can be 
given a continuance to permit time to gather evidence and prepare their 
cases. Alongside the current five-day notice provision in California, for 
example, respondents are already guaranteed the right to at least one 
continuance.376 
B. Reform Service Rules for Domestic Violence Cases 
1. Law Enforcement Service Attempts Pursuant to VAWA Should 
Provide Prima Facie Proof of Diligent Effort 
Under VAWA,377 as a condition of receiving federal funds, states must 
certify that petitioners are not charged fees for serving domestic violence 
protection order or restraining order cases378 To comply with federal law, 
all states have adopted laws requiring state and local sheriff and police 
departments to effect service of process in domestic violence cases.379 For 
                                                     
373. Police will not typically serve process at homeless shelters, which is a practice intended to 
encourage unhoused individuals to find shelter and safety without fearing police encounters. This was 
my experience as a live-in staff member at a homeless shelter. 
374. Supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
375. CAL. FAM. CODE § 243 (West 2018) (requiring that service be perfected at least five days prior 
to the hearing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(3) (2017) (requiring personal service upon the 
respondent at least five days prior to the hearing); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.050 (2018) (requiring 
personal service on the respondent at least five days prior to the hearing). 
376. CAL. FAM. CODE § 245(a). 
377. Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (codified in part in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
378. 42 U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(D) (2018). 
379. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.30(2)(a) (West 2018) (specifying a mechanism through 
which the state court pays law enforcement officers a fee for service in each domestic violence case); 
735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-202(a) (West 2018) (“Process shall be served by a sheriff.”).  
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example, New Jersey orders court clerks to immediately forward all 
domestic violence petitions and temporary orders to law enforcement for 
service and mandates that the documents “shall immediately be 
served.”380 Given federal and state law, police and sheriff departments 
should allocate sufficient resources to this important task. If law 
enforcement is unable to effectuate service by the second court date, this 
should serve as prima facie proof of “diligent effort” permitting 
alternative service. 
States should enact presumptions that if law enforcement has not been 
able to accomplish personal service by the second hearing date, the 
petitioner is automatically permitted to utilize an alternative means most 
likely to achieve actual notice. In some jurisdictions, alternative service is 
not available for domestic violence remedies, furthering historic lack of 
protection from abuse; in other jurisdictions, access to alternative methods 
of service is prohibitively difficult. For example, to receive permission to 
utilize alternative service in Pennsylvania, a litigant must show proof of 
“(1) inquiries of postal authorities including inquiries pursuant to the 
Freedom of Information Act, (2) inquiries of relatives, neighbors, friends, 
and employers of the defendant, (3) examinations of local telephone 
directories, courthouse records, voter registration records, local tax 
records, and motor vehicle records, and (4) a reasonable internet 
search.”381 It is also challenging for pro se litigants to separately motion 
the court for alternative service. 
Placing service obligations with law enforcement as mandated by 
federal law and having a ready structure in place for alternative service 
ensures the petitioner’s right to a hearing on the merits, permits methods 
of service still likely to notify the respondent of the case, and makes 
alternative service methods procedurally accessible. This proposition 
relieves petitioners of the obligations of traditional methods for requesting 
alternative service that require specialized legal knowledge, motions to 
the court, and additional court dates and which present access barriers to 
unrepresented petitioners. 
Three states have already adopted laws that automatically permit 
service alternatives in the domestic violence context, which helpfully 
provide predictability and save judicial resources. Minnesota allows the 
                                                     
380. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-28 (West 2018) (requiring clerks to immediately forward domestic 
violence complaints and emergency orders to law enforcement for service and mandating that the 
documents “shall immediately be served”). 
381. PA. R. CIV. P. 430. 
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petitioner’s failed efforts at personal service to be followed by one week 
of published notice and requires the petitioner to mail service to the 
respondent’s last known residence.382 Unlike in most other states, an 
additional motion or judicial permission is not required.383 Pursuant to the 
Rebecca Griego Act,384 courts in Washington now cannot require more 
than two attempts at obtaining personal service, and they must then permit 
service by mail or publication.385 In Nevada, law enforcement agencies 
are required to personally serve respondents,386 but if the respondent’s 
home address is unknown or law enforcement has had at least two failed 
service attempts to the respondent’s place of employment, the law 
automatically permits service by mail to the workplace.387 The Nevada 
solution is limited in that it is only effective when the respondent is 
employed and the petitioner is aware of such employment. The 
recommendations in the following section present more expansive 
options. 
2. Electronic Service for Modern Life 
Procedural rules concerning service and applied to domestic violence 
matters should continue to evolve to respond to technological advances 
and how people function and communicate. Some traditional methods of 
alternative service, namely service via publication in a newspaper or by 
posting a summons at a set location in a courthouse, rarely achieve actual 
notice, which judges and scholars acknowledge.388 In contrast, service via 
mail to a known residential or employment address is more likely to 
communicate notice to the respondent. The most effective way for giving 
timely notice to an individual would often be electronic service, but it is 
not currently permitted as a primary service means for domestic violence 
cases in any jurisdiction. In fact, only three jurisdictions explicitly permit 
electronic service as an alternative form of service for protection orders.389 
                                                     
382. MINN. STAT. § 518B.01 (2018).  
383. Id.; cf., e.g., ALA. R. CIV. P. 4.3(d)(1); D.C. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(a)(3)(A)(i); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:25-28; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 826 (McKinney 2015). 
384. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.50.050 (2018). 
385. Id. 
386. NEV. REV. STAT. § 33.030 (2018). 
387. Id. 
388. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877) (identifying that publishing process “in the 
great majority of cases, would never be seen by the parties interested”); Melodie M. Dan, Social 
Networking Sites: A Reasonably Calculated Method to Effect Service of Process, 1 CASE W. RES. J.L. 
TECH. & INTERNET 183, 207 (2010) (noting that service by publication is unlikely to provide actual 
notice and should be used as a last resort). 
389. ALASKA R. CIV. P. 4(e); D.C. DOM. VIOL. R. 5(c); ME. R. CIV. P. 4(g). 
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Unlike checking the newspaper daily to see if one’s name appears 
regarding a court proceeding, the average person in the United States 
checks his or her cellular phone eighty-six times per day.390 Today, 
individuals across socioeconomic statuses commonly have cellular 
phones. A 2018 Pew Research Center study found that 95% of Americans 
have some type of cellular phone, with 100% of people age eighteen to 
twenty-nine possessing a cellular phone and 98% of Americans age thirty 
to forty-nine owning phones.391 The high ownership rates are significant 
and these age brackets largely match the age demographics of protection 
order litigants. The 2018 Pew study further found that over three-quarters 
of Americans have smartphones, and young adults, non-whites, and 
lower-income Americans particularly rely on smartphones for online 
access.392 
Under current personal service requirements, respondents commonly 
refuse to open the door to accept service or can otherwise evade service 
or be extremely difficult to locate by a third party. Even if the petitioner 
or a third party texts, emails, or mails the petition and summons to the 
respondent, rules that require hand-delivery make actual notice 
insufficient. The constitutional standard simply requires that service be 
“reasonably calculated” to deliver notice to the opposing party. If personal 
service is not readily achievable, a petitioner should be permitted to have 
someone notify the respondent via text message, email, or social media 
message functions about the protection order hearing date, choosing an 
electronic method through which the petitioner and respondent have 
previously or regularly communicated. The server could, for example, 
send via text message images of the petition, summons, and any TPO or 
ask the respondent to check his or her email for the petition, summons, 
and temporary order. Current technology, such as “read receipts” that alert 
the sender when his or her message has been read, could be offered to the 
                                                     
390. Lisa Eadicicco, Americans Check Their Phones Eight Billion Times a Day, TIME (Dec. 15, 
2015), http://time.com/4147614/smartphone-usage-us-2015/ [https://perma.cc/4XSL-4AHK] 
(reporting on a study finding that individuals ages eighteen to twenty-four view their phones an 
average of seventy-four times per day, those who are age twenty-five to thirty-four check their phones 
fifty times per day, and people who are age thirty-five to forty-four look at their phones thirty-five 
times per day); see also Chris Fullwood et al., My Virtual Friend: A Qualitative Analysis of the 
Attitudes and Experiences of Smartphone Users: Implications for Smartphone Attachment, 75 
COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 347 (2017) (discussing “habitual” use of mobile phones). 
391. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MOBILE FACT SHEET (Feb. 5, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-
sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/D63S-YBJL]. 
392. Id. 
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court, assuming the cellular phone user has not deactivated this 
function.393 
A respondent often continues to contact a petitioner directly through 
text or social media messages, yet under current rules the petitioner’s 
response to the respondent providing notice of the case and images of the 
petition and summons is insufficient for notice. Currently, even when the 
respondent acknowledges the protection order case through text message, 
email, or social media responses and posts, the respondent’s actual notice 
paradoxically does not satisfy the personal service requirement. Service 
rules can adapt to realities of life and technology such that a petitioner’s 
text message, email, or social media message notifying the respondent of 
the case could suffice. In proving notice by a third party or the petitioner, 
the petitioner can also provide copies of emails or screenshots of text 
messages or social media communications to the court as proof of service. 
The petitioner can also show the court proof that the respondent has 
recently used the phone number, email address, or social media messaging 
function through their communications history or through read receipts. 
Presuming law enforcement attempts at service fulfill “diligent effort” 
requirements and automatically permitting alternative service methods, 
including electronic service, will remedy current procedural barriers. 
CONCLUSION 
Access to safety and justice for abuse survivors can only be achieved 
when abused individuals are able to access court protection, as legislatures 
intended. This Article seeks to achieve the legislative purpose of civil 
protection orders by actually making this valuable legal remedy available 
to abuse survivors who petition courts for help. 
The law has not historically afforded protection to low-income women 
of color, who disproportionately are the petitioners in protection order 
cases. Current stringent procedural barriers work to impede access to this 
legislative remedy to domestic abuse and, troublingly, result in the 
dismissal of high percentages of cases. Expanding service options to 
address procedural justice and access to courts will help address historic 
and contemporary differential treatment of domestic violence remedies 
while protecting all parties’ due process rights. 
 
                                                     
393. See Sarah Silbert, How to Tell When Someone Reads Your Text Message, LIFEWIRE (Feb. 2, 
2019), https://www.lifewire.com/read-my-text-message-4148206 [https://perma.cc/2JVW-CT9T]. 
